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Abstract. This paper is concerned with a two-fold objective. Firstly,
we establish elicitability and identifiability results for systemic risk measures
introduced in Feinstein, Rudloff, and Weber (2017). Specifying the entire set
of capital allocations adequate to render a financial system acceptable, these
systemic risk measures are examples of set-valued functionals. A functional
is elicitable (identifiable) if it is the unique minimiser (zero) of an expected
scoring function (identification function). Elicitability and identifiability are
essential for forecast ranking and validation, M - and Z-estimation, both pos-
sibly in a regression framework. To account for the set-valued nature of the
systemic risk measures mentioned above, we secondly introduce a theoret-
ical framework of elicitability and identifiability of set-valued functionals.
It distinguishes between exhaustive forecasts, being set-valued and aiming
at correctly specifying the entire functional, and selective forecasts, content
with solely specifying a single point in the correct functional. Uncovering
the structural relation between the two corresponding notions of elicitability
and identifiability, we establish that a set-valued functional can be either se-
lectively elicitable or exhaustively elicitable. Notably, selections of quantiles
such as the lower quantile turn out not to be elicitable in general. Apply-
ing these structural results to systemic risk measures, we construct oriented
selective identification functions, which induce a family of strictly consistent
exhaustive elementary scoring functions. We discuss equivariance properties
of these scores. We demonstrate their applicability in a simulation study
considering comparative backtests of Diebold-Mariano type with a pointwise
traffic-light illustration of Murphy diagrams.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Systemic risk measures
In the financial mathematics literature, there is a great interest in various types of risk
and, in particular, its quantitative measurement. The quantitative assessment of risk
connected to a particular financial position dates back to Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and
Heath (1999) and has since then been discussed, from several points of view, in many
further works, see e.g. Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002), Artzner, Delbaen, and Koch-Medina
(2009), Fo¨llmer and Weber (2015). For a thorough overview of risk measures we refer
the reader to the textbook Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004).
The financial crises of 2007 – 2009 and its aftermaths in the last decade have starkly
underpinned the need to quantitatively assess the risk of an entire financial system rather
than merely its individual entities. One of the first academic works on systemic risk is
the seminal paper Eisenberg and Noe (2001). The focus of this work, however, lies on
modeling the financial system rather than the quantitative measurement of systemic
risk. Since then, financial mathematicians have developed a rich strand of literature, en-
compassing different approaches and emphasising different aspects of systemic risk. The
model of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) has been generalized in different ways, for instance
by considering illiquidity (Rogers & Veraart, 2013) or central clearing (Amini, Filipovic,
& Minca, 2015). One strand of literature defines systemic risk measures by applying a
scalar risk measure to the distribution of the total profits and losses of all firms in the
system (Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, & Richardson, 2016; Adrian & Brunnermeier,
2016). Recognizing the drawbacks of treating the economy as a portfolio, Chen, Iyen-
gar, and Moallemi (2013) introduce an axiomatic approach to measuring systemic risk,
further extended by Kromer, Overbeck, and Zilch (2016) and Hoffmann, Meyer-Brandis,
and Svindland (2016). The axiomatic approach of Chen et al. (2013) is widely used and
amounts to systemic risk measures of the form ρ(Λ(Y )), where Y is a d-dimensional ran-
dom vector representing the financial system, ρ is a scalar risk measure and Λ: Rd → R
a non-decreasing aggregation function. However, this approach of aggregating first and
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then adding a total capital requirement of the system, has the drawback that it results
in the measurement of bailout costs rather than capital requirements that prevent a
financial crisis. These types of risk measures are also called insensitive as they do not
take into account the impact capital regulation has onto the system.
As an alternative, the so called sensitive systemic risk measures have been intro-
duced by Feinstein et al. (2017); see also Biagini, Fouque, Frittelli, and Meyer-Brandis
(2019) and Armenti, Cre´pey, Drapeau, and Papapantoleon (2018) for related approaches.
There, one first adds the capital requirements to the d financial institutions and then
applies an aggregation function, that is, one considers systemic risk measures of the form
R(Y ) = {k ∈ Rd | ρ(Λ(Y + k)) ≤ 0}. (1.1)
Thus, the impact of regulation onto the system is taken into account.
In this paper, we will mainly focus on this type of systemic risk measures as introduced
in Feinstein et al. (2017); see Section 3 for more details. R(Y ) specifies the set of all
capital allocations k ∈ Rd such that the new system Y + k is deemed acceptable with
respect to ρ after being aggregated via Λ. As such, R takes an ex ante perspective pre-
scribing the injections to (and withdrawals from) each financial firm adequate to prevent
the system Y from a crises, whereas ρ(Λ(Y )) as described above can be interpreted as
the bailout costs of the system after a systemic event has occured.
1.2. Elicitability and identifiability
The field of quantitative risk management has seen a lively debate about which scalar
risk measure is most appropriate in practice; see Embrechts, Puccetti, Ru¨schendorf,
Wang, and Beleraj (2014) and Emmer, Kratz, and Tasche (2015) for detailed academic
discussions and Bank for International Settlements (2014) for a regulatory perspective
in banking. Besides differences in axiomatic properties such as coherence (Artzner et
al., 1999) and convexity (Fo¨llmer & Schied, 2002) of risk measures, the debate has also
considered more statistical aspects of risk measures. The two most widely discussed
statistical desiderata are robustness in the sense of Hampel (1971)—cf. Cont, Deguest,
and Scandolo (2010), Kra¨tschmer, Schied, and Za¨hle (2012, 2014)—and elicitability of
risk measures.
A real-valued law-invariant risk measure ρ—or, more generally, a functional T—is
called elicitable if it can be written as the unique minimiser of an expected loss or
scoring function S : R × R → R, that is, T (F ) = arg minx
∫
S(x, y) dF (y) (Lambert,
Pennock, & Shoham, 2008; Osband, 1985). Such a scoring function, which incentivises
truthful forecast from a risk-neutral forecaster, is called strictly consistent ; see Subsection
2.1 for precise definitions. As such, the elicitability of a functional opens the way to
meaningful forecast comparison (Gneiting, 2011a) which is closely related to comparative
backtests in finance (Fissler, Ziegel, & Gneiting, 2016; Nolde & Ziegel, 2017). Similarly,
the elicitability of a functional is crucial forM -estimation and regression, such as quantile
regression (Koenker, 2005; Koenker & Basset, 1978) or expectile regression (Newey &
Powell, 1987). The families of quantiles and expectiles are elicitable, and their most
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prominent members, the median and the mean, have the absolute error, S(x, y) = |x−y|,
and the squared error, S(x, y) = |x−y|2, x, y ∈ R, as strictly consistent scoring functions,
respectively. Therefore, the prominent risk measure Value at Risk (VaR), basically
corresponding to a quantile, is elicitable. On the other hand, Expected Shortfall, a
tail expectation beyond a certain quantile and the most common counterpart in risk
management and regulation, fails to have convex level sets (Gneiting, 2011a; Weber,
2006) which is a necessary condition for elicitability (Osband, 1985). This rules out the
existence of a strictly consistent scoring function for Expected Shortfall (ES), imposing
a major challenge to meaningfully compare ES forecasts. This issue can be overcome at
the cost of additionally reporting VaR at the same level. More to the point, Fissler and
Ziegel (2016) and Acerbi and Szekely (2014) showed that the pair (VaR, ES) is elicitable
despite ES’s failure to have a strictly consistent scoring function on its own. A similar
phenomenon was already known in the case of the elicitable pair (mean, variance),
where variance clearly fails to have convex level sets rendering it non-elicitable. The
key to establish the elicitability of (mean, variance) is that it is a bijection of the first
two moments, which makes it an instance of the revelation principle (Gneiting, 2011a;
Osband, 1985) establishing the elicitability of any bijection of an elicitable functional.
In contrast, there is no known bijection of (VaR, ES) to a functional with elicitable
components only. On the other hand, the positive elicitability result of (VaR, ES) has
triggered a novel structural insight: the Bayes risk, or the minimal expected score, is
jointly elicitable with the corresponding minimiser; see Frongillo and Kash (2018). The
formalisation of how many auxiliary components are needed to render a functional T a
part of a higher dimensional elicitable T ′ has led to the notion of forecast complexity;
see again Frongillo and Kash (2018) and the discussion in Fissler and Ziegel (2016).
For example, the risk measure Range Value at Risk has an elicitation complexity of 3
(Fissler & Ziegel, 2019a), while the mode functional generally possesses a corresponding
complexity of ∞ (Dearborn & Frongillo, 2019; Heinrich, 2014). This means one needs
to report the entire probability distribution, which amounts to considering the infinite
dimensional identity functional (Brier, 1950; Good, 1952; Matheson & Winkler, 1976).
We refer the reader to Gneiting and Raftery (2007) for a comprehensive overview of
probabilistic forecast evaluation.
Closely related to the notion of elicitability is the concept of identifiability. While
the former is useful for forecast comparison or model selection, the latter aims at model
and forecast validation or verification. For real-valued forecasts, a (strict) identification
function V typically maps a forecast-observation pair (x, y) to the real number V (x, y)
such that the expected identification function
∫
V (x, y) dF (y) vanishes (only) at the cor-
rectly specified forecast x = T (F ). Typical examples are V (x, y) = x − y for the mean
or V (x, y) = 1{y ≤ x} − α, x, y ∈ R, for the α-quantile. In statistics and economet-
rics, identification functions are often known as moment functions and give rise to the
(generalised) method of moments (Newey & McFadden, 1994). A functional is called
identifiable if it possess a strict identification function. Steinwart, Pasin, Williamson,
and Zhang (2014) showed that, under appropriate regularity conditions, the identifiabil-
ity of a real-valued functional is equivalent to its elicitability. For probabilistic forecasts,
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considering identification functions is akin to a goodness-of-fit analysis and, in partic-
ular, to assess various notions of calibration with tools such as the probability integral
transform (Gneiting, Balabdaoui, & Raftery, 2007). For a discussion of identifiability
and calibration in the context of assessing risk measures, we refer the reader to Davis
(2016) and Nolde and Ziegel (2017).
1.3. Novel contributions and structure of the paper
The aim of the paper is two-fold: The primary goal is to establish elicitability and identi-
fiability results for systemic risk measures of the form at (1.1), taking the form of subsets
of Rd. As outlined above, the literature on forecast evaluation has mainly focused on
real-valued and vector-valued point forecasts as well as on probabilistic forecasts. While
we could find various areas where forecasts of set-valued functionals are of interest (see
Subsection 2.5 for a review), we are not aware of a comprehensive theoretical framework
for the assessment of forecasts for set-valued functionals. The establishment of such a
framework is therefore our secondary goal, which naturally precedes the presentation of
the main results.
Section 2 formally introduces the notion of elicitability and identifiability for set-valued
functionals. The key observation is that one should thoroughly distinguish whether one is
interested in correctly specifying single points in the corresponding set-valued functional
or if one is more ambitious and aims at correctly specifying the entire set. Mnemon-
ically, we will label the former situation with the adjective selective, and we will use
the term exhaustive to refer to the latter situation. Along with this distinction come
two corresponding modes of elicitability and identifiability. Refining the classical re-
sult of the necessity of the convex level sets property for the elicitability of a functional
(Proposition 2.10) leads the way to Corollary 2.13, the main result of Section 2: The two
modes of elicitability are mutually exclusive—a set-valued functional is either selectively
elicitable or exhaustively elicitable or not elicitable at all, subject to mild regularity con-
ditions. Besides these structural results gathered in Subsection 2.4, Subsection 2.5 gives
an overview of the existing literature on forecast evaluation for set-valued quantities,
covering the fields of (spatial) statistics, machine learning, engineering, climatology and
meteorology, and philosophy.
In Section 3, we discuss measures of systemic risk of the form at (1.1), gathering basic
properties and assumptions. We also consider derived quantities, notably efficient cash-
invariant allocation rules (EARs) introduced in Feinstein et al. (2017).
The main results about the identifiability and elicitability of systemic risk measures and
derived quantities are gathered in Section 4. The most notable ones are Theorem 4.1
asserting the existence of oriented selective identification functions for R0(Y ) = {k ∈
Rd |Λ(ρ(Y +k)) = 0}, and Theorem 4.9, which uses these identification functions to con-
struct strictly consistent exhaustive scoring functions for R. That means while the first
argument of the selective identification functions is a single capital allocation k ∈ Rd
deemed suitable to exactly eliminate the risk of the financial system Y under R, the
first argument of the exhaustive scoring functions is a subset A ⊆ Rd, consisting of all
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capital allocations k ∈ Rd deemed appropriate to render Y acceptable under R. Inter-
estingly, these scoring functions arise as an integral construction of elementary scoring
functions, exploiting the orientation of the identification function. This can be consid-
ered a higher-dimensional analogon to the mixture representation of scoring functions
for one-dimensional forecasts established in the seminal paper Ehm, Gneiting, Jordan,
and Kru¨ger (2016). Similarly, this gives rise to the diagnostic tool of Murphy diagrams
facilitating the assessment of forecast dominance; see Subsection 4.2.6. Characterisation
results of all consistent scoring functions are discussed and order-sensitivity results of
these consistent scoring functions are established. Concerning EARs mentioned above,
Proposition 4.6 establishes strict selective identification functions for EARs, interestingly
mapping to a function space.
Since systemic risk measuresR of the form at (1.1) are translation equivariant in the sense
that R(Y + k) = R(Y )− k for all k ∈ Rd and—under mild assumptions—homogeneous
in that R(cY ) = cR(Y ) for all c > 0 (Lemma 5.2), it makes sense to determine the sub-
classes of translation invariant or positively homogeneous consistent scoring functions
for R, which is the content of Section 5.
The elicitability results of R rely on the identifiability / elicitability of the underlying
scalar risk measure ρ. This spells doom for the elicitability of systemic risk measures
induced by ES as a scalar risk measure. Section 6 outlines this issue and establishes a
solution to this challenge at the cost of a higher forecast complexity. Similarly to the
scalar case, considering a pair of R based on ES with a VaR-related quantity leads to
selective identifiability and exhaustive elicitability results (Proposition 6.1 and Theorem
6.2).
The practical applicability of our results is demonstrated in terms of a simulation study,
being the content of Section 7. Employing Diebold-Mariano tests, we examine how well
the strictly consistent scores are able to distinguish different forecast performances. We
also graphically illustrate the diagnostic tool of Murphy diagrams in a simulation exam-
ple.
Section 8 closes the paper with a discussion and outlook of possible applications of our
results and avenues of future research.
Results concerning risk measures insensitive with respect to capital allocations are col-
lected in Appendix A. All proofs and purely technical results are deferred to Appendix
B, while Appendix C contains some further graphics of simulation results in the context
of Subsection 7.2.
2. Two modes of elicitability and identifiability
2.1. Consistent scoring functions for point-valued functionals
We use the decision-theoretic framework described for example in Gneiting (2011a); cf.
Savage (1971), Osband (1985), Lambert et al. (2008), Fissler and Ziegel (2016, 2019c).
Let (Ω,F,P) be some complete, atomless probability space rich enough to accommodate
all random elements mentioned in the sequel. We consider a time series (Yt)t∈N of obser-
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vations of interest Yt taking values in some measurable space (O,O), called observation
domain. Suppose there are m ∈ N different forecasters, where, at time point t− 1, each
forecaster i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} issues a one-step ahead forecast Xi,t for time point t ∈ N,
taking values in an action domain A, equipped with some σ-algebra A. Describing the
evolving information of each forecaster i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} in terms of a filtration (Gi,t)t∈N0
and taking into account that the forecasts are non-anticipating, the time series (Xi,t)t∈N
is (Gi,t)t∈N0-predictable while (Yt)t∈N is (Gi,t)t∈N0-adapted; cf. Stra¨hl and Ziegel (2017).
In order to rank and compare the different sequences of forecasts, one commonly eval-
uates the corresponding prediction-observation sequences (Xi,t, Yt)t∈N in terms of a loss
or scoring function. This is a measurable map S : A × O → R∗ := (−∞,∞] such that
the prediction-observation pair (x, y) ∈ A×O is assigned the penalty S(x, y) ∈ R∗.1 For
A = O = R, standard examples are the squared loss S(x, y) = (x − y)2 or the absolute
loss S(x, y) = |x − y|. After N ≥ 1 time steps, the forecasters are ranked in terms of
their realised scores
Si,N =
1
N
N∑
t=1
S(Xi,t, Yt), (2.1)
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Invoking either a utility maximisation argument or a law of large num-
bers argument (under suitable mixing assumptions), each forecaster i has an incentive
to minimise their expected realised score E[Si,N ] over (X1, . . . , XN ) such that Xi,t is
Gi,t−1-measurable (denoted by Xi,t ∈ Gi,t−1). Hence, the optimal action, or Bayes-act,
at each time point is given by
X∗i,t = arg min
Xi,t∈Gi,t−1
E[S(Xi,t, Yt)] = arg min
Xi,t∈Gi,t−1
E[S(Xi,t, Yt) | Gi,t−1] ,
if the (conditional) expectations exist.
The choice of the scoring function might be justified by an economically meaningful
interpretation as a cost function. Alternatively, a directive for an ideal forecast might
be given in terms of some statistical property of FYt|Gi,t−1 , (the regular version of) the
conditional distribution of Yt given Gi,t−1. Standard examples for such a property are
the mean, some quantile, a risk-measure, or the probability distribution itself, giving rise
to probabilistic forecasts. Mathematically speaking, the directive is given in terms of
some functional T : M→ A, which is commonly a map from M, a space of probability
distributions or distribution functions containing the conditional distributions of the
form FYt|Gi,t−1 , to the action domain A. In the latter setting, it is widely argued that the
scoring function should incentivise truthful forecasts (Engelberg, Manski, & Williams,
2009; Murphy & Daan, 1985) in that∫
S(T (F ), y)dF (y) ≤
∫
S(x, y)dF (y) (2.2)
1Often in the literature, one considers only scoring functions that take finite values and which are
assumed to have finite expectation for any argument x. Including the value +∞ into the codomain
however facilitates the technical treatment in the present context. Moreover, it also avoids problems
for the certain widely used scoring functions such as the log-score for probabilistic forecasts; see
Gneiting and Raftery (2007) and the discussion therein.
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for all distributions F ∈ M, for all x ∈ A, and where equality implies that x = T (F ).
In line with Fissler and Ziegel (2016) we call a scoring function S strictly M-consistent
for T : M → A if it satisfies (2.2), where we implicitly assume that EF [S(x, Y )] :=∫
S(x, y)dF (y) exists for all x ∈ A, F ∈ M and takes a value in R∗. For the sake
of brevity, we shall henceforth use the shorthand S¯(x, F ) := EF [S(x, Y )]. Following
Lambert et al. (2008) and Gneiting (2011a), we call a functional T : M→ A elicitable if
it possesses a strictly M-consistent scoring function.
2.2. Selective and exhaustive scoring functions
Many statistical functionals, such as the mean-functional or variance, are point-valued,
taking values in R for univariate observations (or in Rd and Rd×d for multivariate obser-
vations). In such a situation, possible actions take the form of points, such that A ⊆ R
(or of vectors or matrices, respectively, such that A ⊆ Rd or A ⊆ Rd×d). Then the
functional can be considered as a map T : M→ A, and in particular, there is a unique
best action, namely the functional value T (F ) ∈ A for F ∈ M. Moreover, there is no
‘severe ambiguity’ of how to choose the action domain A. That is, any reasonable choice
of A will be that of a subset from the same space. E.g. if one considers mean forecasts
for a real-valued observation, then A ⊆ R. Maybe it makes sense to consider A ⊆ [0,∞)
if one knows that the observation is non-negative, but it would not be reasonable at all
to choose A = R2.
On the other hand, there are also statistical functionals that are inherently set-
valued. Examples for such a situation can be manifold, e.g. expectations of random
sets (Molchanov, 2017), where real-world examples of random sets might stem from cli-
matology and meteorology (the area affected by a flood), reliability engineering (parts of
a machine being affected by extreme heat) or medicine (tumorous tissue in the human
body); cf. Bolin and Lindgren (2015). The main examples of set-valued functionals we
have in mind are on the one hand law-invariant measures of systemic risk R : M→ 2Rd
introduced in Feinstein et al. (2017). On the other the hand, we follow option (ii) of the
interesting discussion provided in Mizera (2010, p. 170), and will consider quantiles to
be set-valued. That is, for some α ∈ (0, 1), the α-quantile qα is defined as
qα : M→ 2R, qα(F ) := {x ∈ R | lim
t↑x
F (t) ≤ α ≤ F (x)}.
To unify notation, set-valued functionals take the form
T : M→ 2W ,
where W is some generic space. Now, there are two sensible choices for the action domain
A:
(i) A = Asel ⊆ W : The elements of the action domain Asel representing possible fore-
casts are points in the space W . Truthful reporting means there are generally
multiple best actions, namely all selections t ∈ T (F ) ⊆ Asel for F ∈M. Mnemon-
ically, we shall refer to Asel as a selective action domain.
9
(ii) A = Aexh ⊆ 2W : The elements of the action domain Aexh representing possible
forecasts are subsets of the space W . Truthful reporting means there is a unique
best action, namely the exhaustive functional T (F ) ∈ Aexh for F ∈ M. Similarly,
we shall refer to Aexh as an exhaustive action domain.
The two different choices of action domains lay claim to different levels of precision and
ambition of the forecasts. Whereas selective forecasts from Asel are content to specifying
one single point in the set of interest—e.g. one location affected by a flood, one tumorous
cell, one capital allocation making a financial system acceptable, or one point such that
the distribution function attains a certain level α—, exhaustive forecasts from Aexh
aim at specifying the entire set of interest simultaneously. E.g. they specify the entire
expected region affected by a flood, the entire expected tumorous tissue, the entire set
of acceptable capital allocations, or the whole set of values such that the distribution
function attains a certain level α.
For a certain function T : M→ 2W , the connection between the choice of the selective
action domain Asel ⊆ W and the exhaustive action domain Aexh ⊆ 2W will be specified
if needed for a certain result, otherwise remaining unspecified. However, a sensible
connection between the two choices one might have in mind is
Asel =
⋃
B∈Aexh
B .
To allow for a rigorous treatment of forecast evaluation for set-valued functionals, we
continue to use the dichotomy introduced above also for scoring functions evaluating
forecasts for some set-valued functional T : M→ 2W .
Definition 2.1 (Consistency). (i) A selective scoring function Ssel : Asel ×O→ R∗ is
M-consistent for T : M→ 2Asel if
S¯sel(t, F ) ≤ S¯sel(x, F ) ∀x ∈ Asel, ∀t ∈ T (F ), ∀F ∈M. (2.3)
The selective score Ssel is strictly M-consistent for T if it is M-consistent for T
and if equality in (2.3) implies that x ∈ T (F ).
(ii) An exhaustive scoring function Sexh : Aexh ×O→ R∗ is M-consistent for T : M→
Aexh if
S¯exh(T (F ), F ) ≤ S¯exh(B,F ) ∀B ∈ Aexh, ∀F ∈M. (2.4)
The exhaustive score Sexh is strictly M-consistent for T if it isM-consistent for T
and if equality in (2.4) implies that B = T (F ).
Note that the strict consistency of a selective (exhaustive) scoring function Ssel implies
that S¯sel(t, F ) ∈ R for all F ∈ M, t ∈ T (F ) (S¯exh(T (F ), F ) ∈ R for all F ∈ M).
Along with the definitions of the two modes of consistency come two ways of defining
elicitability.
Definition 2.2 (Elicitability). (i) A functional T : M → 2Asel is selectively elicitable
if it possesses a strictlyM-consistent selective scoring function Ssel : Asel×O→ R∗.
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(ii) A functional T : M → Aexh is exhaustively elicitable if it possesses a strictly M-
consistent exhaustive scoring function Sexh : Aexh × O→ R∗.
If there is no risk of confusion, we shall drop the indices “sel” and “exh” to indicate
the difference between selective and exhaustive interpretations, respectively.
For point-valued functionals such as the mean, the distinction between selective and
exhaustive elicitability is obsolete, since any choice of an action domain leads to a unique
best action. Hence, one is actually always in the exhaustive setting, and there is no
point in mentioning this fact explicitly. Of course, we could identify a point-valued
functional T : M → A with the set-valued functional T ′ : M → A′ = {{a} | a ∈ A}
where T ′(F ) = {T (F )}. Then clearly, the exhaustive and selective elicitability of T ′ are
equivalent, and they are equivalent to the elicitability of T ; see Lemma 2.6.
While we are only aware of contributions to the literature which either consider the
selective or the exhaustive interpretation (see Subsection 2.5), one novelty in the present
paper is that we thoroughly study and compare these two alternative notions (see Sub-
section 2.4).
2.3. Selective and exhaustive identification functions
The notion of identifiability is closely connected to the notion of elicitability. Similarly to
scoring functions, an identification function is a measurable map V : A × O → R where
we again make the tacit assumption that V¯ (x, F ) := EF [V (x, F )] :=
∫
V (x, y)dF (y)
exists for all x ∈ A, F ∈ M with the additional assumption that the expectation
be finite.2 Expectations of strictly consistent scoring functions are minimised by the
correctly specified forecast for the functional at hand. Likewise, the set of zeros of
the expectation of a strict identification function coincides with the correctly specified
forecast for the functional at hand. Again, we make the distinction between selective
and exhaustive identification functions to allow for a rigorous treatment of set-valued
functionals.
Definition 2.3 (Identification function). (i) A map Vsel : Asel × O → R is a selective
M-identification function for T : M → 2Asel if V¯sel(t, F ) = 0 for all t ∈ T (F ) and
for all F ∈ M. Moreover, Vsel is a strict selective M-identification function for T
if
V¯sel(x, F ) = 0 ⇐⇒ x ∈ T (F ), ∀x ∈ Asel, ∀F ∈M. (2.5)
(ii) A map Vexh : Aexh×O→ R is an exhaustiveM-identification function for T : M→
Aexh if V¯exh(T (F ), F ) = 0 for all F ∈ M. Moreover, Vexh is a strict exhaustive
M-identification function for T if
V¯exh(B,F ) = 0 ⇐⇒ B = T (F ), ∀B ∈ Aexh, ∀F ∈M. (2.6)
2At the costs of a more involved technical treatment we could also consider identification functions
mapping to [−∞,∞]. However, we do not see the benefits in the present context which is why we
omit this approach.
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Definition 2.4 (Identifiability). (i) A functional T : M→ 2Asel is selectively identifi-
able if it possesses a strict selective M-identification function.
(ii) A functional T : M → Aexh is exhaustively identifiable if it possesses a strict ex-
haustive M-identification function.
In the literature about point-valued functionals, it has appeared to be appropriate
to be a bit more flexible with the choice of the space the identification functions map
to. In particular, Osband (1985), Frongillo and Kash (2015b) and Fissler and Ziegel
(2016) suggest that the dimension of the identification function should coincide with the
dimension of the forecasts. Indeed, statistical practice demands to evaluate the realised
identification function, which can be seen as the counterpart of (2.1) upon replacing
S with V . To this end, V needs to map to some linear space such as some functional
space (Proposition 4.6). Moreover, note that in order to define a property in the spirit
of (2.5) or (2.6), it is not essential that the expected identification function attains a 0
at the correctly specified forecast (or an element thereof in the selective setting), but
rather that it attains some predefined particular value(s)—the important requirement
being that this value be identifiable in the common sense; see Proposition 4.6 where we
introduce a sort of generalised version of (selective) identifiability where the left-hand
side of (2.5) is replaced by some more general statement.
Similarly to elicitability, when dealing with point-valued functionals, the distinction
between selective and exhaustive identifiability is rather artificial and they essentially
coincide; see Lemma 2.6.
According to Steinwart et al. (2014), we say that a strict identification function V : R×
R→ R for a real-valued functional T : M→ R is called oriented if for all x ∈ R and for
all F ∈M
V¯ (x, F )

< 0, if x < T (F )
= 0, if x = T (F )
> 0, if x > T (F ).
They also show that under some continuity assumptions on the functional T there exists
an oriented identification function for T .
2.4. Structural results
In this subsection, we gather structural relations between the notions of selective and
exhaustive elicitability and identifiability, respectively. The first lemma, of which the
proof is standard, basically states that these notions are equivalent for point-valued
functionals.
Lemma 2.5. Let T : M → A be some point-valued functional taking values in some
space A. Define the set-valued functional T ′(F ) := {T (F )}, F ∈M. Then T ′ : M→ 2A
is selectively elicitable (identifiable) if and only if T ′ : M → A′ = {{a} | a ∈ A} is
exhaustively elicitable (identifiable). Moreover, the selective elicitability (identifiability)
of T ′ : M→ 2A is equivalent to the elicitability (identifiability) of T .
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The next lemma is concerned with selections of set-valued functionals. For a set
W 6= ∅ and a set-valued functional T ′ : M→ 2W , a point-valued functional T : M→W
is a selection of T ′ if T (F ) ∈ T ′(F ) for all F ∈M.
Lemma 2.6. Let T ′ : M→ 2A be a set-valued functional with T ′(F ) 6= ∅ for all F ∈M,
and let T : M→ A be a selection of T ′.
(i) If S : A × O → R∗ is a (strictly) M-consistent selective scoring function for T ′,
then it is an M-consistent scoring function for T .
(ii) If V : A × O → R is a strict selective M-identification function for T ′, then it is
an M-identification function for T .
Clearly, the scoring function S (identification function V ) appearing in Lemma 2.6 is
only strict for T if T ′ is a singleton onM, that is, T ′(F ) = {T (F )} for all F ∈M. This
suggests the question as to whether the selection can be elicitable (identifiable) at all,
which the following proposition is concerned with.
Proposition 2.7. Let T ′ : M→ 2A be selectively elicitable and T : M→ A a selection
of T ′. Let M1 := {F ∈M|T ′(F ) = {T (F )}} and suppose that M\M1 6= ∅.
Let S ′M (S ′M1) be the class of strictly M-consistent (M1-consistent) selective scoring
functions for T ′. If S ′M = S ′M1, then T : M→ A is not elicitable.
A common problem when applying Proposition 2.7 for practical purposes is that most
characterisation results concerning the class of strictly consistent scoring functions as-
sume regularity conditions on the scoring functions such as continuity or differentiability;
cf. Table 1 in Gneiting (2011b) or Osband’s Principle (Fissler & Ziegel, 2016; Osband,
1985). Note that Proposition 2.16 establishes an alternative route to a similar result
which does not rely on such a characterisation result of the class of strictly consistent
scoring functions.
While for point-valued functionals mapping to A = R and satisfying sufficient regular-
ity conditions, identifiability and elicitability are equivalent (Steinwart et al., 2014), this
is not always the case if one weakens the regularity conditions.3 A classical result dating
back to the seminal work of Osband (1985) is that convex level sets (CxLS) of a functional
are necessary both for elicitability and identifiability; see also Fissler and Ziegel (2019c)
for some refinements. Steinwart et al. (2014) showed that for point-valued functionals,
the CxLS property is even sufficient for elicitability under some additional regularity
conditions. Continuing with the consequent distinction between selective and exhaus-
tive elicitability (identifiability) for set-valued functionals, we state the corresponding
CxLS properties.
Definition 2.8. Let T : M → 2W be a set-valued functional on some convex class of
measures M.4
3E.g., the lower α-quantile is elicitable relative to the class of strictly increasing distribution functions.
However, it fails to be identifiable if some of the distributions are discontinuous in their α-quantile.
On the other hand, the canonical scoring function S(x, y) = (1{y ≤ x} − α)(x − y) is still strictly
consistent on that class. The discontinuity only implies that the expected scores are not differentiable.
4That is, for any F0, F1 ∈M and for any λ ∈ (0, 1) it holds that (1− λ)F0 + λF1 ∈M.
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(i) T has the selective CxLS property if for any F0, F1 ∈M and λ ∈ (0, 1)
T (F0) ∩ T (F1) ⊆ T
(
(1− λ)F0 + λF1
)
.
(ii) T has the selective CxLS* property if for any F0, F1 ∈M and λ ∈ (0, 1)
T (F0) ∩ T (F1) 6= ∅ =⇒ T (F0) ∩ T (F1) = T
(
(1− λ)F0 + λF1
)
.
(iii) T has the exhaustive CxLS property if for any F0, F1 ∈M and λ ∈ (0, 1)
T (F0) = T (F1) =⇒ T (F0) = T
(
(1− λ)F0 + λF1
)
.
Note that the exhaustive CxLS property is the most common one in the literature,
and the one used for point-valued functionals (Bellini & Bignozzi, 2015; Delbaen, Bellini,
Bignozzi, & Ziegel, 2016; Steinwart et al., 2014; Wang & Wei, 2018). The selective
CxLS property follows the one proposed in Gneiting (2011a), while the selective CxLS*
property is novel. However, it is noteworthy that the recent paper Brehmer and Strokorb
(2019) introduced the notion of max-functionals. Using our notation, a real-valued
functional T : M→ R is called a max-functional if for any F0, F1 ∈M and λ ∈ (0, 1)
T
(
(1− λ)F0 + λF1
)
= max
(
T (F0), T (F1)
)
.
It is immediate that a real-valued functional T : M→ R is a max-functional if and only
if the set-valued functional T+(F ) := [T (F ),∞) satisfies the selective CxLS* property.
The following implications are immediate.
Lemma 2.9. Let T : M → 2W be a set-valued functional on some convex class of
measures M.
(i) If T has the selective CxLS* property, then it also has the selective and the exhaus-
tive CxLS property.
(ii) If T is singleton-valued, then the selective CxLS property, the exhaustive CxLS
property and the selective CxLS* property are equivalent.
The second point of Lemma 2.9 underpins why the distinction of the CxLS properties
is obsolete for the point-valued case.
It is classical knowledge originating from the seminal work of Osband (1985) that the
exhaustive CxLS property is necessary for exhaustive elicitability and exhaustive identi-
fiability, and that the selective CxLS property is necessary for selective elicitability and
selective identifiability. What is novel is that the selective CxLS* property is necessary
for selective elicitability.
Proposition 2.10. Let T : M→ 2Asel be a set-valued functional on some convex class of
measures M. If T is selectively elicitable, then it satisfies the selective CxLS* property.
For our next result, we need to introduce a property which essentially excludes any
degenerate cases of set-valued functionals, e.g. being singleton-valued.
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Definition 2.11. A set-valued functional T : M → 2W has the proper-subset property
if there are F,G ∈M such that
∅ 6= T (G) ( T (F ).
Theorem 2.12. Let T : M→ Aexh be a set-valued functional on a convex class M. If
T satisfies the proper-subset property and the selective CxLS* property, then it is not
exhaustively elicitable.
Proposition 2.10 and Theorem 2.12 establish that the notion of selective and exhaustive
elicitability are mutually exclusive under the mild proper-subset property.
Corollary 2.13 (Mutual exclusivity). Let M be a convex class of distributions and
T : M → Aexh ⊆ 2Asel a set-valued functional with the proper-subset property. Then it
holds that
(i) if T is selectively elicitable, it is not exhaustively elicitable;
(ii) if T is exhaustively elicitable, it is not selectively elicitable.
This structural insight is an entirely novel and interesting result. It basically estab-
lishes that there are only three pairwise disjoint classes of set-valued functionals:
(1) The class of selectively elicitable functionals.
(2) The class of exhaustively elicitable functionals.
(3) The class of functionals which are not elicitable at all.
Some examples are in order.
Example 2.14. (i) Any α-quantile is selectively elicitable. If the class M is reason-
ably large (e.g. it contains all measures with finite support), then the α-quantile
clearly satisfies the proper-subset property. Hence, they fail to be exhaustively
elicitable.
(ii) If M is the class of distributions on R with finite support, then the mode func-
tional is selectively elicitable onM with the strictlyM-consistent selective scoring
function S(x, y) = 1{x 6= y} (Gneiting, 2017; Heinrich, 2014). Since the mode func-
tional satisfies the proper-subset property on M, it also fails to be exhaustively
elicitable on M.
(iii) In Theorem 4.9 we establish the exhaustive elicitability of the set-valued systemic
risk measure R defined at (3.1). The cash-invariance property of R implies that it
satisfies the proper-subset property. This means R cannot be selectively elicitable.
(iv) Any elicitable real-valued functional T : M → R induces trivial set-valued func-
tionals T−(F ) := (−∞, T (F )] and T+(F ) = [T (F ),∞). Clearly, the elicitability of
T is equivalent to the exhaustive elicitability of T− and T+ considered as maps to
A− = {(−∞, x] |x ∈ R} and A+ = {[x,∞) |x ∈ R}, e.g. by invoking the revelation
principle (Fissler, 2017; Gneiting, 2011a; Osband, 1985). If T is not constant on
M, then T− and T+ also satisfy the proper-subset property, which means they
violate the selective CxLS* property such that they are not selectively elicitable.
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Vice versa, if T+ or T− satisfies the selective CxLS* property, then T or −T is a
max-functional in the sense of Brehmer and Strokorb (2019) such that T (and −T )
is not elicitable unless it is constant. This recovers Theorem 3.3 in Brehmer and
Strokorb (2019) and shows that it is, indeed, a special case of Theorem 2.12.
Remark 2.15. It is worth noting the structural difference between elicitability and
identifiability. While Theorem 2.12 carries over to exhaustive identifiability with an
easy adaption of the proof,5 it does not seem to be possible to establish an analogon of
Proposition 2.10 for selective identifiability due to possible cancellation effects. One can
merely establish that selective identifiability implies the selective CxLS property. There-
fore, it remains open if selective and exhaustive identifiability are mutually exclusive in
the sense of Corollary 2.13.
Let us take another look at selections of selectively elicitable functionals T , such as the
lower quantile if T is the quantile functional. Proposition 2.7 rules out the elicitability of
such selections. However, the practical applicability of this result seems to be somewhat
limited since one needs to know the class of all strictly consistent scoring functions for
T and the corresponding selection. And these characterisation results typically impose
regularity conditions on the scoring functions—if they are known at all. Interestingly,
an argument similar to the one used in the proof of Theorem 2.12 leads to a result which
rules out the elicitability of selections under very weak conditions on the functional. In
particular, it dispenses with regularity conditions on scoring functions.
In line with Bellini and Bignozzi (2015) we call a functional T from a convex class of
distributions to some topological space A mixture-continuous if for any F0, F1 ∈ F the
map [0, 1] 3 λ 7→ T ((1− λ)F0 + λF1) ∈ A is continuous.
Proposition 2.16. Let M be a convex class of distributions and T : M→ 2A, T 6= ∅,
a functional satisfying the selective CxLS* property. Suppose there are distributions
F,G,H ∈M such that
T (F ) ∩ T (G) = {t1}, T (F ) ∩ T (H) = {t2}, with t1 6= t2. (2.7)
Then, any selection Tsel : M→ A of T fails to be elicitable and identifiable. In particular,
if A is a space with a Fre´chet topology,6 then any selection Tsel fails to be mixture-
continuous.
We would like to emphasise that the mere failure of mixture-continuity of Tsel does not
rule out its elicitability. Indeed, Proposition 2.2 in Fissler and Ziegel (2019c) (cf. Propo-
sition 3.4 in Bellini and Bignozzi (2015)) only rules out the existence of a continuous
strictly consistent scoring function for Tsel.
5For ∅ 6= T (G) ( T (F ) and a strict exhaustive M-identification function V for T the CxLS* property
implies that
0 = V¯ (T (G), (1− λ)F + λG) = (1− λ)V¯ (T (G), F ) + λV¯ (T (G), G) = (1− λ)V¯ (T (G), F ) 6= 0
for any λ ∈ (0, 1), which is a contradiction.
6That is, if for any a, b ∈ A with a 6= b there is an open set U ⊆ A such that a ∈ U and b /∈ U .
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We would like to remark that the α-quantile satisfies the condition at (2.7) if the class
M is reasonably large, e.g. contains all distributions with finite support. Therefore,
Proposition 2.16 rules out the elicitability of any selection of the quantile on such classes,
e.g. the lower quantile or the selection introduced in the recent preprint Aronow and Lee
(2018).
2.5. Literature on forecast evaluation for set-valued functionals
2.5.1. Statistical forecast evaluation
While Lambert et al. (2008) only consider real-valued functionals where the distinction
between selective and exhaustive scoring functions is superfluous, the influential paper
Gneiting (2011a) treats functionals as potentially set-valued; cf. Bellini and Bignozzi
(2015). However, only the concept of selective scoring functions with the corresponding
notion of (strict) consistency and elicitability are given. Presumably, the motivation for
doing so was induced by the quantile-functional as one of the most prominent examples
of a set-valued functional. To the best of our knowledge, forecasts for the quantile are
exclusively considered in the selective sense (Gneiting, 2011b; Koenker, 2005; Komunjer,
2005), in which they are elicitable. The reason for not considering them in the exhaustive
sense might lie in the impossibility of establishing corresponding elicitability results, of
which the first formal proof—to the best of our knowledge—is given in this paper.
On the other hand, the literature on evaluating prediction intervals considers reports
for these functionals typically in the exhaustive sense, meaning that an interval is re-
ported rather than a single point. Gneiting and Raftery (2007, Sections 6.2 and 9.3)
consider consistent exhaustive scores for the central (1 − α)-prediction interval. This
basically amounts to a prediction for a pair of quantiles at the α/2- and (1−α/2)-level.
If one fixes a certain coverage of, say, 1− α, this ansatz can be generalised to construct
consistent scoring functions for a non-central (1 − α)-prediction interval of which the
endpoints are specified in terms of quantiles at level β and β + 1− α, where β ∈ (0, α).
Schlag and van der Weele (2015) also consider exhaustive scoring functions for interval-
valued predictions. However, they start with a certain scoring function of appeal to
them and do not thoroughly characterise the functional which is elicited by this scoring
function. Finally, we would like to refer the reader to Askanazi, Diebold, Schorheide,
and Shin (2018) for a good overview of interval forecasts, who, however, mostly present
impossibility results. While the complexity of reporting interval forecasts is quite mod-
est and actually amounts to specifying a two-dimensional vector, our results, and in
particular the mutual exclusivity result of Corollary 2.13, provide a novel insight in that
there cannot be a scoring function R×R→ R such that the expected score is minimised
on an interval between two quantiles.
2.5.2. Statistical theory and risk measurement
Quantiles and expectiles (Newey & Powell, 1987) of univariate distributions are well
known (selectively) elicitable functionals. In the risk measure literature, they are also
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common scalar risk measures. There are different competing attempts to generalise
them to a multivariate setting. We refer the reader to two recent and insightful pa-
pers and the corresponding references therein: Hamel and Kostner (2018) introduce
multivariate quantiles taking the form of convex sets, and Daouia and Paindaveine
(2019) introduce hyperplane-valued multivariate M -quantiles with a particular focus
on hyperplane-valued multivariate expectiles. For both approaches, it remains an in-
triguing open question whether these functionals are selectively elicitable, exhaustively
elicitable or not elicitable at all.
2.5.3. Spatial statistics
As Azzimonti, Ginsbourger, Chevalier, Bect, and Richet (2018) point out, the “problem
of estimating the set of inputs that leads a system to a particular behavior is common
in many applications”, and they explicitly mention the fields of reliability engineering
and climatology (see references therein). That means, the quantity of interest Y is a
random set which is often specified as an excursion set {z ∈ Rd | ξz ≥ t}, t ∈ R, of
some random field (ξz)z∈Rd . Functionals of interest are often various expectations of
random sets as described in the comprehensive textbook Molchanov (2017), notably, the
Vorob’ev expectation (Chevalier, Ginsbourger, Bect, & Molchanov, 2013), the distance
average expectation (Azzimonti, Bect, Chevalier, & Ginsbourger, 2016) and conservative
estimates based on Vorob’ev quantiles (Azzimonti et al., 2018). The most common
evaluation metric—or scoring function—seems to be the symmetric distance in measure
S(X,Y ) = µ(X4Y ), where µ is some measure on (Rd,B(Rd)), but also (pseudo-)metrics
such as the Hausdorff distance and others (Molchanov, 2017, pp. 286–290) might make
sense. Interestingly, the distance in measure admits a straight forward interpretation
as the sum of false positive and false negative events via the identityµ(X4Y ) = µ(X \
Y )+µ(Y \X), which suggests also asymmetric versions of this measure, taking the form
(1− α)µ(X \ Y ) + αµ(Y \X), α ∈ [0, 1].
While we are unaware of a thorough discussion of exhaustive elicitability of functionals
of random sets, we would like to mention that the Vorob’ev median (Molchanov, 2017, p.
285) possesses at least a consistent exhaustive scoring function with S(X,Y ) = µ(X4Y )
for some measure µ on (Rd,B(Rd)) (Molchanov, 2017, Proposition 2.2.8),7 and that the
Vorob’ev mean is a solution to a restricted minimisation problem with respect to the
same scoring function (Molchanov, 2017, Theorem 2.2.6).
Ascending to a higher level, the collection of all Fre´chet means—as a collection of sets
(Molchanov, 2017, Definition 2.2.18)—is selectively elicitable by definition.
One area of particular interest in spatial statistics is meteorology and climatology. In
these disciplines, forecast evaluation is more commonly known under the term forecast
verification. We refer the reader to the comprehensive overview paper Dorninger et al.
(2018). Besides simply comparing a set-valued forecast and a set-valued observation as
outlined above, there are also more involved situations covered. E.g. acknowledging the
7This suggests a similar relation between the Vorob’ev quantile and the asymmetric distance in measure
presented above.
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spatio-temporal structure of many processes such as precipitation, one might evaluate
probabilistic forecasts for the marginal distributions of the random field of interest at
certain grid points, using the neighbourhood method (see Dorninger et al. (2018) for
references). Assessing the entire joint distribution of the random field seems extremely
ambitious and we are unaware of any verification method at the moment.
2.5.4. Regression and Machine Learning
Recent literature on isotonic regression embraces the idea of explicitly modelling func-
tionals as set-valued; see Jordan, Mu¨hlemann, and Ziegel (2019) and Mo¨sching and
Du¨mbgen (2019), where the two papers consider these functionals in the selective sense.
In the area of machine learning, the recent paper Gao, Chen, Chenthamarakshan, and
Witbrock (2019) considers set-valued regression as well, however, considering finite sets
only. The observations (or response variables) Yt are finite subsets of some label space S,
which is assumed to be at most countably finite. Denoting the regressors with Xt ∈ Rp
then they are interested in finding a function m : Rp → {I | I ⊆ S, |I| < ∞} such
that m(Xt) is reasonably close to Yt. However, they do not explicitly specify the loss
function they use for the regression problem. In an orthogonal direction, Zaheer et al.
(2017) consider the case of set-valued regressors rather than set-valued responses, which
does not lead to the question of an appropriate choice of loss function with set-valued
arguments.
2.5.5. Philosophy
Within a more philosophical strand of literature about credences, i.e., subjective proba-
bilities of degrees of belief, Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler (2016) argue that imprecise cre-
dences about the probability of a binary event can be represented as subsets of the unit
interval [0, 1]; cf. Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane (2012). They consider numerical
accuracy measures, being functions of the set-valued credence and the binary outcome.
In this regard, they consider scoring functions taking sets as arguments. However, this
ansatz is distinct from our focus since we consider forecasts for functionals which are
inherently set-valued and dispense with a discussion of subjective probabilities, whereas
they consider set-valued forecasts for a functional which is actually real-valued, namely
the probability of a binary event.
3. Measures of systemic risk
We consider set-valued systemic risk measures studied in Feinstein et al. (2017). In
particular, we concentrate on law-invariant risk measures R that are induced by some
law-invariant scalar risk measure ρ. To settle some notation, let (Ω,F,P) be an atomless
probability space. For some integer d ≥ 1, let Yd ⊆ L0(Ω;Rd) be some subclass of
d-dimensional random vectors. From a risk management perspective, a random vector
Y = (Y1, . . . , Yd) ∈ Yd represents the respective gains and losses of a system of d financial
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firms. That is, positive values of the component Yi represent gains of firm i and negative
values correspond to losses. Let Md be the class of probability measures of elements
of Yd. Let Λ: Rd → R be an aggregation function meaning that it is non-decreasing
with respect to the componentwise order. An aggregation function is typically, but not
necessarily, assumed to be continuous or even concave. We introduce Y ⊆ L0(Ω;R)
where {Λ(Y ) |Y ∈ Yd} ⊆ Y and let M be the class of distributions of elements of Y.
Where convenient we will tacitly assume that Yd and Y are closed under translation
meaning that X ∈ Y, Y ∈ Yd implies that X + m ∈ Y and Y + k ∈ Yd for all m ∈ R,
k ∈ Rd.
We consider some scalar monetary law-invariant risk measure ρ : Y → R8 (Artzner
et al., 1999). That means, we can alternatively consider ρ as a map ρ : M → R such
that for a random variable X ∈ Y with distribution FX ∈M we define ρ(FX) := ρ(X).
We assume that ρ is cash-invariant, that is, ρ(X + m) = ρ(X) −m for all m ∈ R and
all X ∈ Y, and monotone, meaning X ≥ Z P-a.s. implies that ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Z) for all
X,Z ∈ Y. We often dispense with the usual normalisation assumption that ρ(0) = 0.
We present the two most natural law-invariant set-valued measures of systemic risk that
are based on ρ and Λ, namely
R : Yd → 2Rd , Y 7→ R(Y ) = {k ∈ Rd | ρ(Λ(Y + k)) ≤ 0}, (3.1)
Rins : Yd → 2Rd , Y 7→ Rins(Y ) = {k ∈ Rd | ρ(Λ(Y ) + k¯) ≤ 0}. (3.2)
In (3.2) and later on, we have used the shorthand k¯ :=
∑d
i=1 ki for some vector k =
(k1, . . . , kd) ∈ Rd. Note the difference between R and Rins. The risk measure R takes an
ex ante perspective in the sense that it specifies all capital allocations k ∈ Rd needed to be
added to the system Y to make the aggregated system Λ(Y +k) acceptable under ρ. On
the other hand, Rins takes an ex post perspective on quantifying the risk of the system Y .
That means it first considers the current aggregated system Λ(Y ) and then specifies the
total capital requirement k¯ one needs to add to make the aggregated system acceptable,
which amounts to specifying the bail-out costs of the aggregated system Λ(Y ) under ρ. In
particular, the risk measure Rins is insensitive to the capital allocation to each financial
firm, disregarding possible transaction costs or other dependence structures between the
financial firms. This justifies the mnemonic terminology. We would like to remark that
both risk measures, R and Rins, can be of interest in applications, taking into regard
the different perspectives on systemic risk. However, the mathematical treatment and
complexity differ considerably: Due to the cash-invariance of ρ, Rins takes the equivalent
form
Rins(Y ) = {k ∈ Rd | ρ(Λ(Y )) ≤ k¯}.
This means that Rins is actually a bijection of the scalar risk measure ρ ◦ Λ: Md → R
considered in Chen et al. (2013). Therefore, one has to evaluate the risk measure ρ
only once to determine Rins. In contrast, such an appealing equivalent formulation is
8Very often, the scalar risk measure is assumed to map to R∗ = (−∞,∞]. We could also do that at the
costs of a more technical treatment. However, to avoid unnecessary technicalities, we refrain from
that and will assume throughout the paper that any scalar risk measure will attain real values only.
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generally not available for R, unless Λ is additive, or is even the sum in which case R
and Rins coincide. Consequently, in general, one is bound to evaluate ρ infinitely often
to compute R; see also the discussion in Feinstein et al. (2017). The main focus of this
paper are elicitability and identifiability results of systemic risk measures of the form at
(3.1) and (3.2). However, since one can exploit the one-to-one relation between Rins and
ρ ◦ Λ and make use of the revelation principle (Fissler, 2017; Gneiting, 2011a; Osband,
1985) to establish (exhaustive) elicitability and identifiability results, we do not present
results about Rins in the main body of the paper, but rather gather some interesting
observations in Appendix A.
For the sake of completeness, we evoke the most important properties of R presented
in Feinstein et al. (2017). Due to the properties that ρ is cash-invariant and that Λ is
increasing, we obtain that the values of R defined at (3.1) are upper sets. That means
for any Y ∈ Yd, R(Y ) = R(Y ) + Rd+, where Rd+ := {x ∈ Rd |x1, . . . , xd ≥ 0} and where
for any two sets A,B ⊆ Rd, A+B := {a+b | a ∈ A, b ∈ B} denotes the usual Minkowski
sum. Mutatis mutandis, the same is true for Rins. Following the notation of Feinstein
et al. (2017), we denote the collection of upper sets in Rd with ordering cone Rd+ as
P(Rd;Rd+) := {B ⊆ Rd |B = B + Rd+}.
Note that both Rd and ∅ are elements of P(Rd;Rd+). Moreover, R defined at (3.1) can
attain these values even if the underlying scalar risk measure ρ maps to R only, e.g.,
when Λ is bounded. While the case R(Y ) = ∅ corresponds to the case that a scalar risk
measure of a financial position is +∞, meaning that the system Y + k is deemed risky
no matter how much capital is injected, the case R(Y ) = Rd corresponds to −∞ in the
scalar case. The latter situation of “cash cows” with the possibility to withdraw any
finite amount of money without rendering the position risky is usually deemed unrealistic
and is excluded. Therefore, we shall usually only discuss the former case, but remark
that a treatment of the latter were also possible for most results.
The cash-invariance and monotonicity carry over to R (Rins) in that for all Y, Z ∈ Yd
with Y ≥ Z P-a.s. componentwise and all k ∈ Rd, R(Y ) ⊇ R(Z), and R(Y + k) =
R(Y )− k.
To shorten the notation, we also introduce further subclasses of P(Rd;Rd+) where B(Rd)
denotes the Borel-σ-algebra.
Definition 3.1. (i) The class of Borel-measurable upper subsets of Rd is denoted with
P̂(Rd;Rd+) :=
(P(Rd;Rd+) ∩ B(Rd)) \ {Rd}.
(ii) The class of closed upper subsets of Rd is denoted with F(Rd;Rd+). Note that
F(Rd;Rd+) ⊂ P̂(Rd;Rd+).
We shall regularly make use of the following assumptions.
Assumption (1). For all Y ∈ Yd, R(Y ) ∈ P̂(Rd;Rd+).
Assumption (2). For all Y ∈ Yd, R(Y ) ∈ F(Rd;Rd+) and the set {k ∈ Rd | ρ(Λ(Y +
k)) = 0} corresponds to the topological boundary ∂R(Y ) of R(Y ).
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If Λ: Rd → R is continuous and ρ satisfies the Fatou property (which means it is lower-
semicontinuous), the values of R are closed. Note that the law-invariance of ρ implies
the Fatou property (Jouini, Schachermayer, & Touzi, 2006). If moreover the function
Λ: Rd → R is strictly increasing, the second part of Assumption (2) is satisfied as well.
On the other hand, if ρ is convex (i.e., the corresponding acceptance set is convex) and
Λ is concave, then R(Y ) is convex (Feinstein et al., 2017).
Similarly to R, we introduce the law-invariant map
R0 : Yd → 2Rd , Y 7→ R0(Y ) = {k ∈ Rd | ρ(Λ(Y + k)) = 0}, (3.3)
Note that for R(Y ) 6= ∅, R0(Y ) is non-empty if the first part of Assumption (2) is
satisfied. Since Λ is increasing and ρ is cash-invariant, one then obtains the relation
R(Y ) = R0(Y ) + Rd+.
That means that the values of R0 determine R completely. Moreover, if Λ is strictly
increasing, then R0(Y ) can be characterised as the topological boundary of R(Y ) which
has the interpretation that R0(Y ) contains the efficient capital allocations that make Y
acceptable under R. That means for such situations, R and R0 are connected via a one-
to-one relation. Again, this means that exhaustive elicitability results for R (Theorem
4.9) carry over to R0 for such situations, invoking the revelation principle.
Finally, we introduce an important scalarization of the systemic risk measure R, called
efficient cash-invariant allocation rule (EAR), as introduced in Feinstein et al. (2017).
Under certain circumstances, an EAR can also be considered as a selection of R, or
alternatively, of R0. Roughly speaking, for Y ∈ Yd, the value of EAR(Y ) gives the
capital allocation(s) with minimal weighted costs of an allocation in R(Y ). For simplicity,
we shall confine attention to EARs with a fixed price or weight vector w ∈ Rd++ := {x ∈
Rd |x1, . . . , xd > 0}. To settle some notation, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 3.2 (EAR). An efficient cash-invariant allocation rule for a fixed price vector
w ∈ Rd++ is given by
EARw(Y ) = arg min
k∈R(Y )
w>k . (3.4)
Note that EARw(Y ) is well defined and non-empty for w ∈ Rd++ if R(Y ) is closed and
there is a supporting hyperplane for R(Y ) that is orthogonal to w. EARw(Y ) is then
necessarily the intersection of R0(Y ) and this hyperplane. If R(Y ) is not closed, the
minimum in (3.4) might not be attained, resulting in EARw(Y ) = ∅. If, on the other
hand, there is no supporting hyperplane for R(Y ) orthogonal to w, w>k for k ∈ R(Y )
is unbounded from below and we have again EARw(Y ) = ∅.
As discussed in Feinstein et al. (2017), EARw(Y ) is actually not necessarily a singleton.
More precisely, for closed R(Y ) it fails to be a singleton if and only if ∂R(Y ) contains a
line segment that is orthogonal to the price vector.
Since the scalar risk measure ρ is assumed to be law-invariant, also the derived quan-
tities R, Rins, R0 and EARw are law-invariant. Therefore, we shall frequently abuse
notation and write R(FY ) := R(Y ) for Y ∈ Yd with distribution FY ∈Md; with analo-
gous conventions for the other law-invariant maps.
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4. Main results
We present some of the main results of the paper in this section where we gather identi-
fiability results in Subsection 4.1 and elicitability results are presented in Subsection 4.2.
Theorem 4.1 establishes the selective identifiability of R0. Remarkably, the fact that this
selective identification function can usually be chosen to be oriented in an appropriate
sense allows for an integral construction of strictly consistent exhaustive scoring func-
tions for R (Theorem 4.9). Moreover, the selective identifiability of R0 also implies that
efficient cash-invariant allocation rules (EARs) are selectively identifiable (Proposition
4.6).
Notably, the main assumption behind Theorem 4.1 and the subsequent results relying
on this identifiability is the identifiability of the underlying scalar risk measure ρ in (3.1).
A fortiori, it needs to admit an oriented identification function. Invoking Theorem 8 in
Steinwart et al. (2014) this is equivalent to the elicitability of ρ under mild regularity
conditions. Propositions 4.8 and A.4 establish that under certain assumptions on the
aggregation function Λ also the converse holds. That is, the elicitability of R implies the
elicitability of ρ.
4.1. Identifiability results
Theorem 4.1. Let ρ : M → R be identifiable. Then the following assertions hold for
R0 : Md → 2Rd defined at (3.3).
(i) R0 is selectively identifiable. If Vρ : R×R→ R is a strictM-identification function
for ρ, then
VR0 : Rd × Rd → R, (k, y) 7→ VR0(k, y) = Vρ(0,Λ(y + k)) (4.1)
is a strict selective Md-identification function for R0.
(ii) If Vρ : R × R → R is an oriented strict M-identification function for ρ, then VR0
defined at (4.1) is oriented for R0 in the sense that for all F ∈Md it holds that
V¯R0(k, F )

< 0, if k /∈ R(F )
= 0, if k ∈ R0(F )
> 0, if k ∈ R(F ) \R0(F ).
(4.2)
Remark 4.2. The orientation of VR0 can be considered as the multivariate counterpart
of the orientation of Vρ with respect to the componentwise order on Rd. Indeed, in both
cases, a negative expected identification function corresponds to the case of predicting
a capital requirement too small to make the system Y ∈ Yd acceptable with respect to
R or the single firm X ∈ Y acceptable with respect to ρ.
Note that if VR0 : Rd × Rd → R is a strict selective Md-identification function for R0
which is oriented in the sense of (4.2) and which is such that the expected identification
function V¯R0(·, F ) is continuous for any F ∈Md, then the values of R are closed sets.
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Remark 4.3. Equation (4.1) states explicitly how to construct a strict selective Md-
identification function VR0 : Rd ×Rd → R for R0, given a certain strictM-identification
function Vρ : R × R → R for ρ. So VR0 definitely depends on the choice of Vρ. Fissler
(2017, Proposition 3.2.1) states that under some richness assumptions on the class M,
any other strict identification function V˜ρ : R× R→ R for ρ is of the form
V˜ρ(x, z) = g(x)Vρ(x, z), (4.3)
where g : R → R is a non-vanishing function. Moreover, if Vρ is oriented, then V˜ρ is
oriented if and only if the function g in (4.3) is strictly positive; see also Steinwart et al.
(2014, Theorem 8). Consequently, starting with such an identification function V˜ρ, the
resulting (oriented) strict selective Md-identification function V˜R0 : Rd × Rd → R takes
the form
V˜R0(k, y) = V˜ρ(0,Λ(y + k)) = g(0)Vρ(0,Λ(y + k)). (4.4)
Hence, the only difference is that one ends up with a scaled version of VR0 where the
scaling factor g(0) is positive if both VR0 and V˜R0 are oriented.
9
In a similar spirit as Remark 4.3, one might also wonder whether the (oriented) strict
selective identification functions constructed in Theorem 4.1 are the only (oriented) strict
selective identification functions for R0. This is definitely not the case since due to the
linearity of the expectation, any function V ′R0 : R
d × Rd → R with
V ′R0(k, y) = h(k)VR0(k, y) = h(k)Vρ(0,Λ(y + k)), (4.5)
where h : Rd → R is non-vanishing, is again a strict selective Md-identification function
for R0. Moreover, if VR0 is oriented, then V
′
R0
defined at (4.5) is oriented if and only if
h > 0. In particular, the constant g(0) appearing in (4.4) can be incorporated into the
function h such that we see that it does not matter which (oriented) strict exhaustive
identification function V˜ρ we choose to end up with the form at (4.5). The following
theorem establishes that basically all selective Md-identification functions for R0 are of
the form at (4.5).
Proposition 4.4. Let A ⊆ Rd and let VR0 , V ′R0 : A × Rd → R be strict selective Md-
identification functions for R0 : Md → 2Rd. If for every x ∈ A there are F1, F2 ∈ Md
such that V¯R0(x, F1) > 0 and V¯R0(x, F2) < 0 and Md is convex, then there is a non-
vanishing function h : A→ R such that
V¯ ′R0(x, F ) = h(x)V¯R0(x, F ) (4.6)
for all x ∈ A and all F ∈Md.
Remark 4.5. (i) It is worth mentioning that the assumptions of Proposition 4.4 imply
that R0 is surjective on A ⊆ Rd. That is why we formulated the proposition in
terms of a general action domain A ⊆ Rd rather than Rd.
9In the light of Lemma 5.3 (see also Remark 5.4), this provides also an argument that there is—
up to scaling—only one translation invariant identification function for any translation equivariant
functional; compare also to the discussion in Fissler and Ziegel (2019c).
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(ii) If Md is rich enough, and under additional regularity conditions on VR0 , one can
also establish a pointwise version of (4.6); see Fissler and Ziegel (2016, 2019b) for
details.
For any vector w ∈ Rd, we use the notation w⊥ := {x ∈ Rd |w>x = 0} for the
orthogonal complement of the subspace spanned by w. With Rw⊥ we denote the space
of all functions mapping from w⊥ to R.
Proposition 4.6. Let ρ be a scalar risk measure, R and R0 as defined in (3.1) and
(3.3), and suppose that Assumption (2) holds. Assume that R0 is selectively identifiable
with an oriented strict selectiveMd-identification function VR0. Let w ∈ Rd++ and define
the map VEARw : Rd × Rd → Rw⊥ via
VEARw(k, y) : w
⊥ → R, w⊥ 3 x 7→ VEARw(k, y)(x) = VR0(k + x, y).
for (k, y) ∈ Rd × Rd. Then VEARw is a strict selective Md-identification function for
EARw in the sense that for any F ∈Md and any k ∈ Rd
k ∈ EARw(F ) ⇐⇒
(
V¯EARw(k, F ) ≤ 0 ∧ V¯EARw(k, F )(0) = 0
)
. (4.7)
If the underlying risk measure R is known to assume convex sets only (e.g. if ρ is
convex and Λ concave), it is even sufficient to evaluate V¯EARw(k, F )(x), or its empirical
counterpart, for x ∈ Rd in a neighbourhood of 0, which can also nicely be seen in Figure
3 in Appendix B.2.
Since the selective identifiability in Proposition 4.6 deviates from the usual definition,
it is worth investigating its implication in terms of level sets.
Lemma 4.7. Let Md be convex. Under the conditions of Proposition 4.6, EARw satis-
fies the selective CxLS property.
The proof of Lemma 4.7 is standard and therefore omitted. The selective CxLS
property of EARw suggests the open question as to whether EARw also satisfies the
selective CxLS* property or, alternatively, the exhaustive CxLS property. We conjecture
that it satisfies the selective CxLS* property which would imply the possibility that
EARw might also be selectively elicitable. Note that for the situation when EARw is
a singleton and therefore can be considered as a selection of R, Lemma 4.7 and also
this conjecture are not ruled out by the result of Proposition 2.16. Indeed, Theorem 4.9
below establishes that R satisfies the exhaustive CxLS property, and the cash-invariance
induces the proper-subset property which in turn implies that R does not satisfy the
selective CxLS* property.
We would like to compare the concept of identifiability introduced in Proposition 4.6
to the discussion about the backtestability of loss value at risk in Section 5 of Bignozzi,
Burzoni, and Munari (2018). One can interpret their proposal as using a function-
valued identification function, too. Then, their analogue of (4.7) is that the infimum of
the function-valued identification function be 0 if using the correctly specified forecast.
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Interestingly, this version of identifiability does not imply that the functional under
consideration has convex level sets.
We end this section by noting that the identifiability of ρ and the selective identifia-
bility of R0 are even equivalent if Λ: Rd → R possesses a measurable right inverse.
Proposition 4.8. Let ρ : M→ R be a risk measure, Λ: Rd → R a surjective aggregation
function, and R0 : Md → 2Rd as defined in (3.3). Assume that there exists a measurable
right inverse η : R→ Rd such that Λ ◦ η = idR, Y is closed under translations, and that
for any X ∈ Y, η(X) belongs to Yd. Then it holds that ρ is (selectively) identifiable if
and only if R0 is selectively identifiable.
4.2. Elicitability results and mixture representation
In the seminal paper Ehm et al. (2016) it is shown that, subject to regularity conditions,
any non-negative scoring function S : R × R → [0,∞] which is consistent for the α-
quantile (the τ -expectile) can be written as a mixture or Choquet representation
S(x, y) =
∫
R
Sθ(x, y) dH(θ), x, y ∈ R, (4.8)
where H is a non-negative measure on B(R) and Sθ, θ ∈ R, are non-negative elementary
scoring functions for the α-quantile (the τ -expectile). In particular, Sθ take the form
Sθ(x, y) =
(
1{θ < x} − 1{θ < y})V (θ, y) (4.9)
where V is an oriented identification function for the α-quantile (the τ -expectile). The
score at (4.8) is strictly consistent if and only if the measure H is strictly positive, that
is, it puts positive mass on any open non-empty set. Ziegel (2016) and Dawid (2016)
argued that this construction also works for more general one-dimensional functionals
besides expectiles and quantiles which admit an oriented identification function; cf. Jor-
dan et al. (2019). Steinwart et al. (2014) showed that, for one-dimensional functionals
satisfying certain regularity conditions, the existence of such an oriented identification
function is equivalent to the elicitability of the functional. While the orientation of the
identification function immediately gives rise to the consistency of the elementary scores,
and thus, of the mixtures at (4.8), an answer to the question as to whether all scoring
functions for a certain functional are necessarily of the form at (4.8) can typically only
be answered invoking Osband’s Principle (Fissler & Ziegel, 2016; Osband, 1985) hence
assuming smoothness and regularity conditions.
Our construction of strictly consistent exhaustive scoring functions for the systemic
risk measures R also exploits the key result about the existence of oriented strict selective
identification functions for R0 and is similar in nature to the approach described above.
For any y ∈ Rd, we shall use the notation R(y) := R(δy).
Theorem 4.9. Let VR0 : Rd × Rd → R be such that for all F ∈Md ∪ {δy | y ∈ Rd}
V¯R0(k, F ) ∈
{
(∞, 0], if k /∈ R(F )
[0,∞), if k ∈ R(F ). (4.10)
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(i) Under Assumption (1), for each k ∈ Rd, the map SR,k : P̂(Rd;Rd+)×Rd → [0,∞),
SR,k(A, y) =
(
1R(y)\A(k)− 1A\R(y)(k)
)
VR0(k, y) (4.11)
is a non-negativeMd-consistent exhaustive scoring function for R : Md → P̂(Rd;Rd+).
(ii) Under Assumption (1) and if pi is a σ-finite non-negative measure on B(Rd), the
map SR,pi : P̂(Rd;Rd+)× Rd → [0,∞],
SR,pi(A, y) =
∫
Rd
SR,k(A, y)pi(dk) (4.12)
is a non-negativeMd-consistent exhaustive scoring function for R : Md → P̂(Rd;Rd+).
(iii) If Assumption (2) holds, if VR0 is a strict selective Md-identification function for
R0 and if pi is a σ-finite strictly positive measure on B(Rd), then the restriction of
SR,pi defined at (4.12) to F(Rd;Rd+) × Rd is strictly Md0-consistent for R : Md0 →
F(Rd;Rd+), where Md0 ⊆Md such that S¯R,pi(R(F ), F ) <∞ for all F ∈Md0.
Note that the condition at (4.10) is some weak form of orientation. However, it
does not imply that VR0 is an identification function for R0. In the one-dimensional
setting, such a situation can occur in practice if the underlying risk measure is Value at
Risk and the distributions are not continuous, implying that the corresponding quantile
identification function will nowhere attain 0 in expectation.
Even though we defer the formal proof of Theorem 4.9 to Appendix B.2, we would still
like to sketch and illustrate the idea, taking into account that Theorem 4.9 constitutes
one of the main results of the paper. The key observation is the identity
S¯R,pi(A,F )− S¯R,pi(R(F ), F ) =
∫
R(F )\A
V¯R0(k, F )pi(dk)−
∫
A\R(F )
V¯R0(k, F )pi(dk).
(4.13)
Then, one uses the weak orientation of VR0 given at (4.10) to conclude that the first
integral on the right hand side of (4.13) is ≥ 0 while the second integral is ≤ 0. A
graphic illustration of the situation is provided in Figure 1.
It is in order to make some comments about the scoring functions constructed in
Theorem 4.9.
4.2.1. Comparison with one-dimensional case
The similarity of the mixture representation at (4.12) and (4.8) is obvious. With a closer
look, one can also see the similarities on the level of the elementary scores given at (4.11)
and (4.9). Indeed, (4.9) can be re-written as
Sθ(x, y) =
(
1[y,∞)\[x,∞)(θ)− 1[x,∞)\[y,∞)(θ)
)
V (θ, y).
The form of R(y) can be described explicitly in the following lemma, where we use the
fact that ρ(ρ(0)) = ρ(0)− ρ(0) = 0.
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Figure 1: A graphical illustration of Equation (4.13) for dimension d = 2. Suppose the
red region corresponds to the correctly specified risk measure R(F ) and the
blue region corresponds to some misspecified forecast A. The score difference
S¯R,pi(A,F )− S¯R,pi(R(F ), F ) is an integral of V¯R0(·, F ) over R(F ) \A (the red
only region), plus an integral of −V¯R0(·, F ) over A\R(F ) (the blue only region).
Lemma 4.10. Let R(Y ) = {k ∈ Rd | ρ(Λ(Y + k)) ≤ 0}, Y ∈ Yd, where the scalar risk
measure ρ is decreasing and cash-invariant, and the aggregation function Λ: Rd → R is
increasing. Then, for each y ∈ Rd it holds that
R(y) = Λ−1([ρ(0),∞))− y = Λ−1({ρ(0)}) + Rd+ − y.
Accounting for the sign convention that the negative of a quantile or expectile are
a scalar risk measure, one can see that the elementary scores at (4.11) essentially boil
down to the ones at (4.9) for dimension d = 1.
4.2.2. Integrability
The non-negativity of the elementary scores at (4.11) guarantees that the integral at
(4.12) always exists. However, as stated in part (iii) of Theorem 4.9, these scores are
only strictly consistent if S¯R,pi(R(F ), F ) < ∞, which suggests the question as to when
the integral at (4.12) is finite. A sufficient condition for the latter is that∫
Rd
|VR0(k, y)|pi(dk) <∞.
Therefore, a sufficient condition for the finiteness of S¯R,pi(A,F ) is that VR0 is pi ⊗ F -
integrable.
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4.2.3. Normalisation
By construction, the elementary scores at (4.11), and therefore the scores at (4.12), are
non-negative. It is well known that if a scoring function S(x, y) is (strictly)M-consistent
for some functional T then for λ > 0 and some M-integrable function a : O → R, the
score S′(x, y) = λS(x, y) + a(y), λ > 0 is also (strictly) M-consistent for T . Following
Gneiting and Raftery (2007) we say that S and S′ are equivalent. Therefore, if M
contains all point measures, S′ is strictly M-consistent for T and y 7→ S′(T (δy), y) is
M-integrable, the score S(x, y) = S′(x, y)−S′(T (δy), y) is non-negative by construction.
However, sometimes relaxing the normalisation condition that a score be non-negative
can also help to relax integrability conditions on the scoring function. A standard
example is the squared loss S(x, y) = (x − y)2 which is non-negative, consistent for
the mean relative to any class of distributions with a finite first moment, and strictly
consistent for the mean relative to any class of distributions with a finite second moment.
On the other hand, the equivalent score S′(x, y) = x2 − 2xy maps to R, but is strictly
consistent for the mean relative to any class of distributions with a finite first moment.
In that light, it might be interesting to consider scores S′R,k which are equivalent to the
elementary scores at (4.11). A natural choice might be S′R,k(A, y) = −1A(k)VR0(k, y);
cf. Dawid (2016). This leads to an alternative mixture representation akin to (4.12) of
the form
S′R,pi(A, y) =
∫
Rd
S′R,k(A, y)pi(dk) = −
∫
A
VR0(k, y)pi(dk).
However, since the integrand S′R,k(A, y) may attain both positive and negative values,
one needs to impose that its negative part is pi-integrable in order to guarantee the
existence of the integral.
4.2.4. Characterisation of all consistent scoring functions
There is evidence that—under appropriate regularity conditions—all consistent scoring
functions for the risk measure R are equivalent to a score of the form given at (4.12).
That means, modulo equivalence, the choice of the consistent scoring function boils down
to the choice of the measure pi.
Firstly, note that Proposition 4.4 implies that it does not matter what oriented strict
Md-identification VR0 we actually start with. Indeed, if V ′R0 were another such identi-
fication function, then V ′R0(k, y) = h(k)VR0(k, y) for some positive function h. But this
solely amounts to a change of measure, since VR0(k, y)pi(dk) = V
′
R0
(k, y)pi′(dk), where
pi′ has the density 1/h with respect to pi. Secondly, the class of scoring functions of
the form (4.12) is convex, which is a necessary condition (Gneiting, 2011a). Thirdly,
as observed above, the mixture representation at (4.12) is the natural extension to the
one-dimensional case. As remarked, for the one-dimensional case, one can typically
establish this sort of necessary conditions only invoking Osband’s principle. Since Os-
band’s principle relies on a first-order-condition argument, it has only been established
under smoothness conditions and for the finite dimensional case. We suspect that it is
possible to generalise it to the infinite dimensional setting of predicting upper sets in
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F(Rd;Rd+). Possible approaches might work by borrowing ideas from the calculus of
variations or by considering increments of scores rather than derivatives. However, the
technical treatment of these approaches would be beyond the scope of the paper at hand
such that we defer it to future research.
4.2.5. Order-sensitivity
It is known that—under weak assumptions on a scalar functional T—all strictly consis-
tent scoring functions S for T are order-sensitive or accuracy-rewarding ; see Nau (1985,
Proposition 3), Lambert (2013, Proposition 2), Bellini and Bignozzi (2015, Proposition
3.4). In the scalar setting, this property means that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ T (F ) or T (F ) ≤ x2 ≤ x1
implies that S¯(x1, F ) ≥ S¯(x2, F ). While one gets this useful property essentially ‘for
free’ in the scalar case, asking for order-sensitivity in a multivariate setting is a lot more
involved; see Fissler and Ziegel (2019c). One of the main questions in the multivariate
setting is which order relation to use. In the present situation where our exhaustive
action domain consists of closed upper subsets of Rd, the canonical (partial) order re-
lation is the subset relation. That means the canonical analogue of order-sensitivity
in our setting is that for any distribution F ∈ Md it holds that A ⊆ B ⊆ R(F ) or
A ⊇ B ⊇ R(F ) implies that S¯R,pi(A,F ) ≥ S¯R,pi(B,F ). The following proposition estab-
lishes that this notion of order-sensitivity is fulfilled by all scoring functions introduced
in Theorem 4.9(ii). The proof basically exploits the orientation of the underlying iden-
tification function VR0 , which is a similar argument to the one given in Steinwart et al.
(2014).
Proposition 4.11. Let the assumptions of Theorem 4.9(ii) prevail. Then, the scoring
function SR,pi defined at (4.12) is Md-order-sensitive for R in the sense that for all
A,B ∈ P̂(Rd;Rd+) and for all F ∈Md(
A ⊆ B ⊆ R(F ) or A ⊇ B ⊇ R(F )) =⇒ S¯R,pi(A,F ) ≥ S¯R,pi(B,F ). (4.14)
Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.9(iii), if S¯R,pi(B,F ) <∞ and the inclusions A ⊆ B
or A ⊇ B on the left hand side of (4.14) is strict, then the inequality on the right hand
side is also strict.
4.2.6. Forecast dominance and Murphy diagrams
The notion of (strict) consistency implies that—in expectation—a correctly specified
forecast will score at least as high as (strictly less than) any misspecified score. On
the level of the prediction space setting (Gneiting & Ranjan, 2013; Stra¨hl & Ziegel,
2017), Holzmann and Eulert (2014) showed that for two ideal forecasts, the one mea-
surable with respect to a strictly larger information set is preferred under any strictly
consistent scoring function; cf. Tsyplakov (2014). Patton (2019) demonstrated that, in
general, two misspecified forecasts rank differently under different (consistent) scoring
functions. Therefore, the choice of the scoring function used in practice matters and
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secondary quality criteria besides consistency, such as translation invariance or homo-
geneity, may guide the decision what scoring function to use; see Section 5. For the rare
situation when one forecast scores better than another one uniformly over all consistent
scoring functions, Ehm et al. (2016) coined the term forecast dominance. We give the
corresponding definition here for the situation of exhaustive forecasts for systemic risk
measures R.
Definition 4.12 (Dominance). Let Y ∈ Yd and A,B two (stochastic) forecasts for some
systemic risk measure R of the form at (3.1), taking values in P̂(Rd;Rd+). Assume that
Assumption (1) holds. Then A dominates B if E[SR,pi(A, Y )] ≤ E[SR,pi(B, Y )] for all
consistent scoring functions SR,pi of the form at (4.12) where pi is a σ-finite non-negative
measure on B(Rd).
Note that the expectations are taken over the joint distribution of the forecasts and
the observation.
Since the scores SR,pi at (4.12) are parametrised by the class of non-negative σ-additive
measures on B(Rd), it is not very handy to check forecast dominance in practice using the
definition. To this end, the following corollary is helpful. The proof is straightforward
and therefore omitted.
Corollary 4.13. Let Y ∈ Yd and A,B two (stochastic) forecasts for some systemic risk
measure R of the form at (3.1), taking values in P̂(Rd;Rd+). Assume that Assumption
(1) holds. Then A dominates B if and only if E[SR,k(A, Y )] ≤ E[SR,k(B, Y )] for all
elementary scores SR,k given at (4.11), where k ∈ Rd.
Corollary 4.13 opens the way to an immediate multivariate analogue of Murphy dia-
grams considered in Ehm et al. (2016). That is, if A is a P̂(Rd;Rd+)-valued forecast of a
systemic risk measure R and Y is the corresponding Rd-valued observation of a financial
system, we can consider the map
Rd 3 k 7→ sA(k) = E[SR,k(A, Y )] (4.15)
as a diagnostic tool. For an empirical setting with forecasts A1, . . . , AN ∈ P̂(Rd;Rd+)
and observations Y1, . . . , YN ∈ Rd, (4.15) takes the form
Rd 3 k 7→ sˆN,A(k) = 1
N
N∑
t=1
SR,k(At, Yt). (4.16)
We illustrate the usage of Murphy diagrams in simulation study presented in Subsection
7.2.
5. Homogeneous and translation invariant scoring
functions
Recall that the systemic risk measure R is cash-invariant, or translation equivariant,
meaning that R(Y + k) = R(Y ) − k for all Y ∈ Yd and for all k ∈ Rd. Moreover, if
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ρ and Λ are positively homogeneous, so is R in the sense that R(cY ) = cR(Y ) for all
Y ∈ Yd and c > 0; see Lemma 5.2. Patton (2011), Nolde and Ziegel (2017) and Fissler
and Ziegel (2019c) have argued that it is a reasonable requirement for a scoring function
that ordering different sequences of forecasts in terms of their realised scores be invariant
under transformations to which the functional of interest is equivariant. Therefore, we
discuss translation invariance and positive homogeneity of scores (or score differences)
for R. We start by gathering some elementary definitions.
Definition 5.1 (Homogeneity, translation invariance). (i) A function f : Rd → R is
called positively homogeneous of degree b ∈ R if f(cx) = cbf(x) for all c > 0 and
for all x ∈ Rd.
(ii) A scalar risk measure ρ : Y → R is called positively homogeneous if ρ(cX) = cρ(X)
for all c > 0.
(iii) An exhaustive scoring function S : F(Rd;Rd+) × Rd → R is said to have posi-
tively homogeneous score differences of degree b ∈ R if S(cA, cy) − S(cB, cy) =
cb(S(A, y)− S(B, y)) for all A,B ∈ F(Rd;Rd+), y ∈ Rd and c > 0.
(iv) A selective identification function V : Rd × Rd → R is called translation invariant
if V (k + l, y − l) = V (k, y) for all k, l, y ∈ Rd.
(v) An exhaustive scoring function S : F(Rd,Rd+) → Rd is said to have translation
invariant score differences, if S(A + l, y − l) − S(B + l, y − l) = S(A, y) − S(B, y)
for all A,B ∈ F(Rd,Rd+) and y, l ∈ Rd.
(vi) A measure pi on B(Rd) is translation invariant if pi(A) = pi(A+ l) for all A ∈ B(Rd)
and for all l ∈ Rd.
(vii) A measure pi on B(Rd) is positively homogeneous of degree b ∈ R if pi(cA) = cbpi(A)
for all A ∈ B(Rd) and for all c > 0.
With these definitions in mind, we can now state the following results.
Lemma 5.2. If ρ is a positively homogeneous scalar risk measure and Λ is positively
homogeneous of any degree b ∈ R, R and Rins as defined in (3.1) and (3.2) are positively
homogeneous, i.e. for all c > 0 and Y ∈ Yd, R(cY ) = cR(Y ) and Rins(cY ) = cRins(Y ).
Lemma 5.3. Assume that ρ : M→ R has a strictM-identification function Vρ : R×R→
R. Then the following holds for VR0 : Rd × Rd → R defined at (4.1):
(i) VR0 is translation invariant.
(ii) Assume that Md is convex and that for any x ∈ Rd there are F1, F2 ∈ Md such
that V¯R0(x, F1) > 0 and V¯R0(x, F2) < 0. Then for any translation invariant strict
Md-identification function V ′R0 for R0 there is some λ 6= 0 such that
V¯ ′R0(x, F ) = λV¯R0(x, F )
for all x ∈ Rd and for all F ∈Md.
(iii) If Vρ(0, ·) : R → R is positively homogeneous of degree a ∈ R and Λ is positively
homogeneous of degree b ∈ R, then VR0 is positively homogeneous of degree ab.
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Remark 5.4. Interestingly, part (i) of Lemma 5.3 implies that if ρ : M→ R is identi-
fiable and cash-invariant with a strict M-identification function Vρ : R × R → R, then
V invρ (x, y) := Vρ(0, x+ y) is translation invariant. This result can also be generalised to
translation equivariant functionals, hence establishing the converse of Fissler and Ziegel
(2019c, Proposition 4.7(i)).
Proposition 5.5. Let Assumption (2) hold and assume that ρ is identifiable with an
oriented strict M-identification function Vρ.
(i) Let Ld be the d-dimensional Lebesgue measure and SR,k be an elementary score of
the form at (4.11) with identification function VR0(k, y) = Vρ(0,Λ(y + k)). Then
the scoring function
SR,Ld(A, y) =
∫
Rd
SR,k(A, y)Ld(dk), A ∈ F(Rd;Rd+), y ∈ Rd (5.1)
is translation invariant and Md-consistent for R.
(ii) Any finite Md-consistent scoring function S for R of the form at (4.12) is trans-
lation invariant only if S(A, y) = γSR,Ld(A, y) at (5.1) for some γ ≥ 0.
Note that for all examples of ρ and Λ we are aware of, it holds that for the score at
(5.1) SR,Ld(A, y) is finite if the symmetric difference A4R(y) is bounded and only if it
has a finite Lebesgue measure. Hence, Proposition 5.5(ii) implies that the only finite
translation invariant consistent score is the 0-score.
Proposition 5.6. Let Assumption (2) hold and suppose that VR0 is an oriented strict
selective Md-identification function for R0 which is positively homogeneous of degree
a ∈ R.
(i) Let pi be a non-negative σ-finite positively homogeneous measure of degree b ∈ R
and SR,k be an elementary score of the form at (4.11) with identification function
VR0. Then the scoring function
SR,pi(A, y) =
∫
Rd
SR,k(A, y)pi(dk), A ∈ F(Rd;Rd+), y ∈ Rd (5.2)
is positively homogeneous of degree a+ b.
(ii) Any finiteMd-consistent scoring function S for R of the form at (4.12) is positively
homogeneous of degree a+ b only if S(A, y) = γSR,pi(A, y) at (5.2) for some γ ≥ 0
and for some non-negative σ-finite positively homogeneous measure pi of degree
b ∈ R.
Remark 5.7. For many measures pi and sets A the score SR,pi(A, y) defined at (4.12)
might not be finite which diminishes the practical statistical applicability in the context
of forecast comparison. More to the point, score differences involving SR,pi(A, y) will not
be finite or might even not be defined at all. To overcome this issue we suggest to work
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with the following convention of score differences
SR,pi(A, y)− SR,pi(B, y) :=
∫
Rd
SR,k(A, y)− SR,k(B, y)pi(dk) (5.3)
=
∫
B\A
VR0(k, y)pi(dk)−
∫
A\B
VR0(k, y)pi(dk),
where SR,k are the elementary scores defined at (4.11), which assume finite values only.
Indeed, the integral at (5.3) might exist and might even be finite, even if SR,pi(A, y)
or SR,pi(B, y) are ∞. This can be particularly helpful when working with translation
invariant or positively homogeneous scores.
6. Elicitability of systemic risk measures based on
Expected Shortfall
The two most common scalar risk measures in quantitative risk management are Value
at Risk (V aRα) and Expected Shortfall (ESα) at some level α ∈ (0, 1). Both are
law-invariant scalar risk measures such that we can define them directly as functionals
on appropriate classes of distributions. For a probability distribution function F and
α ∈ (0, 1) we define
V aRα(F ) = − inf{x ∈ R |α ≤ F (x)}, (6.1)
ESα(F ) =
1
α
∫ α
0
V aRβ(F ) dβ
= − 1
α
∫
(−∞,−V aRα(F )]
x dF (x)− 1
α
V aRα(F )
(
F (−V aRα(F ))− α
)
.
The last decade has seen quite a lively debate about which scalar risk measure is best
to use in practice where the debate has mainly focused on the dichotomy of V aRα
and ESα; see Embrechts et al. (2014) and Emmer et al. (2015) for a comprehensive
academic discussion and Bank for International Settlements (2014) for a regulatory per-
spective. V aRα is robust in the sense of Hampel (1971), but ignores losses beyond the
level α. Moreover, Cont et al. (2010) showed that robustness and coherence are mutu-
ally exclusive implying that V aRα fails to be coherent. On the other hand, ESα is a
coherent—thus non-robust—risk measure. As a tail expectation, it takes into account
the losses beyond the level α by definition. Another layer of the joust between the two
risk measures is their backtestability (Acerbi & Szekely, 2014, 2017). While the iden-
tifiability of a risk measure is important, but not necessary for traditional backtesting,
comparative backtesting relies on the elicitability of the risk measure at hand; see Fissler
et al. (2016) and Nolde and Ziegel (2017).
As the negative of a selection of the α-quantile, V aRα is elicitable on any class of dis-
tributions with a unique α-quantile. In stark contrast, Gneiting (2011a) demonstrated
that ESα does generally not satisfy the CxLS property which rules out its elicitability;
cf. Weber (2006).
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Recall that Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.9 establish identifiability and elicitability re-
sults for systemic risk measures based on a scalar risk measure ρ which is identifiable,
and therefore—under weak regularity assumption—elicitable; see Steinwart et al. (2014).
Moreover, Proposition 4.8 establishes that, under weak regularity conditions, the iden-
tifiability / elicitability of ρ is also necessary for the identifiability and elicitability of the
systemic risk measure based on ρ. Therefore, for some aggregation function Λ: Rd → R,
the systemic risk measure RESα(Y ) = {k ∈ Rd |ESα(Λ(Y + k)) ≤ 0}, Y ∈ Yd, generally
fails to be elicitable. On the other hand, for scalar risk measures, Fissler and Ziegel
(2016) established that the pair (V aRα, ESα) is elicitable under weak regularity con-
ditions; cf. Acerbi and Szekely (2014). This might trigger the suspicion that the pair(
RV aRα , RESα
)
mapping to the product space F(Rd;Rd+) × F(Rd;Rd+) is exhaustively
elicitable. We conjecture, however, that
(
RV aRα , RESα
)
, in general, fails to have the
exhaustive CxLS property for d ≥ 2, ruling out its exhaustive elicitability.
Therefore, we need slightly more information thanRV aRα(Y ) = {k ∈ Rd |V aRα(Λ(Y+
k)) ≤ 0} in the other component to render the pair involving RESα elicitable. Note
that RV aRα(Y ) only encodes information about the sign of V aRα(Λ(Y + k)) for each
k ∈ Rd. Apart from k in the boundary of RV aRα(Y ) we know nothing about the
actual size of V aRα(Λ(Y + k)). However, the positive result about the elicitabil-
ity of the pair (V aRα, ESα) actually exploits the fact that for the scoring function
Sα(x, y) = −(1{y ≤ −x}−α)x/α−1{y ≤ −x}y/α, x, y ∈ R, V aRα(F ) is the minimiser
of the expected score while ESα(F ) is its minimum; see Frongillo and Kash (2015a).
Therefore, we shall consider the function-valued functional T V aRα : Yd → RRd where for
each Y ∈ Yd
T V aRα(Y ) : Rd → R, Rd 3 k 7→ T V aRα(Y )(k) = V aRα(Λ(Y + k)). (6.2)
6.1. Identifiability results
To simplify the exposition of the results, we shall make the following assumption about
the class M.
Assumption (3). All distribution functions in M are continuous and strictly increas-
ing.
Note that this assumption imposes also implicit restrictions on the class Md since we
assume that for any Y with distribution in Md, the random variable Λ(Y + k) has a
distribution in M for any k ∈ Rd.
A strict M-identification function V : R2 × R→ R2 for the pair (V aRα, ESα) : M→
R2 is given in terms of
V (v, e, y) =
(
α− 1{y + v ≤ 0}
e+ 1{y + v ≤ 0}y/α+ (1{y + v ≤ 0} − α)v/α
)
,
(v, e) ∈ R2, y ∈ R, which can be verified by a straight forward calculation. This
induces a (non-strict) selective Md-identification function U : RRd × Rd × Rd → R2
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for (T V aRα , RESα0 ) : Md → RR
d × 2Rd . For v : Rd → R, k ∈ Rd and y ∈ Rd it is defined
by
U(v, k, y) =(
α− 1{Λ(y + k) + v(k) ≤ 0}
1{Λ(y + k) + v(k) ≤ 0}Λ(y + k)/α+ (1{Λ(y + k) + v(k) ≤ 0} − α)v(k)/α
)
. (6.3)
Proposition 6.1. For any F ∈Md, the component U2 of U defined at (6.3) is oriented
in the sense that for any k ∈ Rd
U¯2(T
V aRα(F ), k, F )

< 0, if k /∈ RESα(F )
= 0, if k ∈ RESα0 (F )
> 0, if k ∈ RESα(F ) \RESα0 (F ).
(6.4)
Under Assumption (3) the map U is a selective Md-identification function for the func-
tional (T V aRα , RESα0 ) : Md → RR
d × 2Rd.
6.2. Elicitability results
We introduce the following regularity assumption on T V aRα defined at (6.2).
Assumption (4). The functional T V aRα : Md → RRd takes only values in C(Rd;R),
the space of continuous functions from Rd to R.
With a standard argument one can verify that Assumption (3) together with the
continuity of Λ imply Assumption (4).
In order to present the following theorem more compactly, let us introduce Sα,g(x, y) =
(1{y ≤ x} − α)(g(x) − g(y)) for any increasing function g : R → R. Recall that Sα,g is
a non-negative consistent selective scoring function for the α-quantile. Moreover, if g is
strictly increasing, Sg is a strictly consistent selective scoring function for the α-quantile
relative to any classM of distributions such that g isM-integrable; see Gneiting (2011b).
Theorem 6.2. (i) Under Assumption (1), for every k ∈ Rd the function Sk : RRd ×
P̂(Rd;Rd+)× Rd → [0,∞),
Sk(v,A, y) = −1A(k)U2(v, k, y)− 1RESα (y)(k)Λ(y + k) (6.5)
is a non-negativeMd-consistent exhaustive scoring function for (T V aRα , RESα) : Md →
RRd × P̂(Rd;Rd+).
(ii) Under Assumption (1) and if pi1, pi2 are σ-finite non-negative measures on B(Rd),
the map Spi1,pi2 : RR
d × P̂(Rd;Rd+)× Rd → [0,∞],
Spi1,pi2(v,A, y) =
∫
Rd
Sα,gk(−v(k),Λ(y + k))pi1(dk) +
∫
Rd
Sk(v,A, y)pi2(dk), (6.6)
where for each k ∈ Rd the function gk : R → R is non-decreasing and Sk is
given at (6.5), is a non-negative Md-consistent exhaustive scoring function for
(T V aRα , RESα) : Md → RRd × P̂(Rd;Rd+).
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(iii) If Assumptions (2), (3), and (4) hold, if gk is strictly increasing for all k ∈ Rd
and if pi1, pi2 are strictly positive, then the restriction of Spi1,pi2 defined at (6.6)
to C(Rd;R)× F(Rd;Rd+)× Rd is a non-negative strictly Md0-consistent exhaustive
scoring function for (T V aRα , RESα) : Md0 → C(Rd;R) × F(Rd;Rd+), where Md0 ⊆
Md is such that S¯pi1,pi2(T V aRα(F ), RESα(F ), F ) <∞ for all F ∈Md0.
Theorem 6.2(ii) suggests that there is again the possibility to consider Murphy dia-
grams to assess the quality of forecasts for (T V aRα , RESα) simultaneously over all scoring
functions given at (6.6). However, a direct implementation would amount to defining
them on the 2d-dimensional Euclidean space. If one further decomposes the functions
gk in the spirit of Ehm et al. (2016), one would even end up with a map defined on
R × Rd × Rd. However, arguing along the lines of Ziegel, Kru¨ger, Jordan, and Fasciati
(2019), the measure pi1 only accounts for forecast accuracy in the Value at Risk compo-
nent. Therefore, if interest focuses on the Expected Shortfall component, it makes sense
to set pi1 = 0 to facilitate the analysis. This implies that one can consider the Murphy
diagram
Rd 3 k 7→ E[Sk(v,A, Y )]
with the elementary scores Sk given at (6.5). The empirical formulation in the spirit of
(4.16) is straight forward.
7. Examples and simulations
7.1. Consistency of exhaustive scoring function for R
In this subsection, we shall demonstrate the discrimination ability of the consistent
exhaustive scoring functions constructed in Theorem 4.9 via a simulation study. We
shall do so in the context of the prediction space setting introduced in Gneiting and
Ranjan (2013). That means we explicitly model the information sets of each forecaster.
For the sake of simplicity and following Gneiting et al. (2007) and Fissler and Ziegel
(2019a) we choose to consider prediction-observation-sequences that are independent
and identically distributed over time. Despite this simplification, there is still a variety
of parameters to consider in the simulation study:
(i) the dimension of the financial system d,
(ii) the (unconditional) distribution of Yt,
(iii) the aggregation function Λ;
(iv) the scalar risk measure ρ;
(v) the competing forecasts At and Bt, along with their joint distributions with Yt;
(vi) the measure pi (and thus the scoring function SR,pi);
(vii) the time horizon N .
We confine ourselves to the following choices of these parameters.
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(i)–(iii) We work with two different combinations of Yt and Λ. In both cases, we work with
a system with d = 5 participants.
(a) The vector Yt models the gains and losses of the participants in the system.
At any time point t, Yt = µt + t where µt follows a 5-dimensional normal
distribution with mean 0, correlations 0.5 and variances 1, and t follows a
5-dimensional standard normal distribution. Thus, conditionally on µt, Yt has
distribution N5(µt, I5), whereas unconditionally, Yt ∼ N5(0,Σ) with (Σ)ij =
0.5 for i, j = 1, . . . , 5, i 6= j and 2 otherwise. The aggregation function Λ1 is
of the form Λ1(Yt) = (1− β)
∑d
i=1 Y
+
i,t − β
∑d
i=1 Y
−
i,t , as suggested in Amini et
al. (2015), and we set β = 0.75. This way, both gains and losses influence the
value of the aggregation function, however, the losses have a higher weight.
Here and in what follows, x+ and x− denote the positive and negative parts
of x, such that x+ = max(0, x) and x− = −min(0, x).
(b) We consider an extended model of Eisenberg and Noe (2001); see Feinstein et
al. (2017): The participants have liabilities towards each other, Lij,t represents
the nominal liability of participant i towards participant j at time point t,
i, j = 1, . . . , 5. Moreover, each participant i owes an amount Lis,t to society at
time point t. To simplify the simulations and shorten the computing time, we
assume that the liabilities matrix is deterministic and constant in time, so that
we can write Lis instead of Lis,t. Moreover, we denote by L¯s the sum of all
payments promised to society, i.e., L¯s =
∑d
i=1 Lis. The vector Yt represents the
endowments of the participants at time point t. As suggested in Eisenberg and
Noe (2001), if some of the endowments are negative, we introduce a so called
sink node and interpret the negative endowments as liabilities towards this
node. The value of the aggregation function Λ2 corresponds to the sum of all
payments society obtains in the clearing process as described in Eisenberg and
Noe (2001). To simulate the endowments of the participants Yt, we assume
that Yit = (µit + it)
2 for i = 1, . . . , 5 with µt and t specified in (a). We
construct the system in the following way:
• The probability of a participant owing to another participant is 0.8. If
there is a liability from i to j, its nominal value is 2.
• In addition, each participant owes 2 to the society.
(iv) In setting (a), we consider the scalar risk measures V aRα, α ∈ (0, 1), defined at
(6.1), and its expectile-based version defined as EV aRτ (X) = −eτ (X), τ ∈ (0, 1),
where eτ satisfies the equation τE[(X − eτ )+] = (1 − τ)E[(X − eτ )−] (Newey &
Powell, 1987). For the interpretation of expectile-based risk measures in finance
we refer to Bellini and Di Bernardino (2015) and to Ehm et al. (2016) for a novel
economic angle on expectiles. In case (b), however, the aggregation function Λ2
takes nonnegative values only and therefore any financial system would be deemed
acceptable when working with ρ = V aRα or ρ = EV aRτ . Following Feinstein et
al. (2017) we overcome this issue by considering the shifted risk measure ρ˜(X) =
ρ(X) + 0.9L¯s, where ρ = V aRα or ρ = EV aRτ , thus considering the system
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acceptable if V aRα or EV aRτ of the amount that society obtains from the nodes is
at most −0.9L¯s. Using the standard identification functions for V aRα and EV aRτ
(Gneiting, 2011a), the selective identification functions for R0 are the following:
• for ρ(X) = V aRα(X) + a:
VR0(k, y) = α− 1{Λ(k + y)− a ≤ 0}; (7.1)
• for ρ(X) = EV aRτ (X) + a:
VR0(k, y) = τ(Λ(k + y)− a)+ − (1− τ)(Λ(k + y)− a)−. (7.2)
(v) We consider two ideal forecasters with different information sets: Anne has access
to µt and uses the correct conditional distribution of Yt given µt for her predictions.
That is, she issues At = R(N5(µt, I5)) = R(N5(05, I5)) − µt in case (a) and At =
R(N5(µt, I5)2)10 in case (b) for each t = 1, . . . , N . Bob is uninformed and issues
the climatological forecast. That is, he uses the correct unconditional distribution
of Yt for his forecasts. Therefore, he constantly predicts Bt = R(N (05,Σ)) in case
(a) and Bt = R(N (05,Σ)2) in case (b).
(vi) We choose pi to be a 5-dimensional Gaussian measure with mean m ∈ R5 and
covariance I5. To enhance the discrimination ability of the score SR,pi, we aim
at choosing m close to the boundary of R(Yt). Here we work with m = 2 · 1
as this value appears to be fairly close to the (deterministic) forecasts of Bob in
all four cases. This choice of pi turns out to be beneficial with respect to the
integrability considerations and renders our scores finite. Indeed, since VR0 for
ρ = V aRα + a is bounded, it is pi ⊗ F -integrable for any finite measure pi. In the
case of ρ = EV aRτ + a, more considerations are necessary. From the construction
of Λ2 it is clear that it is a bounded function, in particular, the values lie in the
interval
[
0,
∑d
i=1 Lis
]
. This in turn implies that the identification function VR0 is
bounded. Therefore VR0 is pi⊗F -integrable for any finite measure pi. Finally, since
Λ1 only grows linearly and both pi and Yt are Gaussian, the integrability is also
guaranteed in this case.
(vii) We work with sample sizes N = 250, being a good proxy for the number of working
(and trading) days in a year.
To compare Anne’s with Bob’s forecast performance, we employ the classical Diebold-
Mariano test (Diebold & Mariano, 1995) based on the scoring functions SR,pi of the form
at (4.12) arising from our choice of pi and identification functions introduced in (7.1) and
(7.2). We repeat the experiment 1 000 times for setting (a) and 100 times for setting
(b).11 We approximate pi with a Monte Carlo draw of size 100 000. The computations
are performed with the statistics software R, and in particular its Rcpp package to also
integrate parts of C++ code to enhance the computational speed.
10We use the notationNd(m,Σ)2 for the distribution of a random variable Y = X2 where X ∼ Nd(m,Σ).
11Due to the presence of clearing, the computation time tends to be quite lengthy in setting (b).
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H0 V aR0.01 V aR0.05 EV aR0.01 EV aR0.05
Λ1
A  B 0.995 0.940 1.000 1.000
A  B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Λ2
A  B 0.740 0.870 0.790 0.900
A  B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 1: Ratios of rejections of the null hypotheses at significance level 0.05.
We consider tests with two different one-sided null hypotheses. H0 : E [SR,pi(A1, Y1)] ≥
E [SR,pi(B1, Y1)], or in short H0 : A  B, means that Bob has a better forecast perfor-
mance than Anne, evaluated in terms of SR,pi. On the contrary, H0 : A  B stands for
H0 : E [SR,pi(A1, Y1)] ≤ E [SR,pi(B1, Y1)] asserting that Anne’s forecasts are superior to
Bob’s in terms of SR,pi. In Table 1 we report the relative frequencies of the rejections for
the respective null hypotheses. Invoking the sensitivity of consistent scoring functions
with respect to increasing information sets established in Holzmann and Eulert (2014),
we expect that Anne’s forecasts are deemed superior to Bob’s predictions. And in fact,
the null A  B is never rejected for either scenario, while A  B is rejected in between
74% and 100% of all experiments over the various scenarios. In particular, with rejec-
tion rates for H0 : A  B between 0.94 and 1, we observe that the discrimination ability
between Bob and Anne is considerably higher for model (a) as opposed to (b) where we
yield rejection rates ranging from 0.74 to 0.90. This might be due to the fact that Λ1 is
unbounded whereas Λ2 only takes values between 0 and L¯s, which might translate into
a smaller influence of the predictive distributions upon which the forecasts are based.
Moreover, both in case (a) and (b), the number of instances when Anne’s forecasts are
preferred over Bob’s ones is higher for ρ = EV aRα + a than for ρ = V aRα + a.
7.2. Murphy diagrams
In this subsection, we illustrate the use of Murphy diagrams, following Corollary 4.13.
To allow for graphical illustrations, we reduce the dimension to d = 2, translating case
(a) of subsection 7.1 to d = 2. In particular, we have Yt = µt + t where µt follows a
2-dimensional normal distribution with mean 0, variances 1 and correlations 0.5, and t
follows a 2-dimensional standard normal distribution. As the scalar risk measure ρ we
only consider V aR0.05 and we use the aggregation function Λ1 : R2 → R, i.e., Λ(x) =
0.25(x+1 +x
+
2 )−0.75(x−1 +x−2 ). Besides focused Anne and climatological Bob introduced
above both using their respective information sets ideally, we also consider Celia. Just
like Anne, Celia has access to µt resulting in the same information set. However, she
misinterprets it and issues sign-reversed forecasts Ct assuming that Yt ∼ N2(−µt, I2).
That is, Ct = R(N2(−µt, I2)) = R(N2(0, I2)) + µt. Again, we consider a time horizon of
N = 250.
In the left panel of Figure 2 we illustrate the differences of empirical Murphy diagrams
[−5, 5]2 3 k 7→ sˆ250,f1(k) − sˆ250,f2(k) = 1250
∑250
t=1 SR,k(f1t, Yt) − SR,k(f2t, Yt) where f1t,
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Figure 2: Left panel: Differences of empirical Murphy diagrams sˆ250,f1(k) − sˆ250,f2(k)
from (4.16) versus k ∈ R2. Right panel: Three-zone traffic light illustration
of pointwise comparative backtests following Fissler et al. (2016). The green
area corresponds to the region where the null H+0 : f1  f2 is rejected, the red
one is where H−0 : f1  f2 is rejected, at level 0.05, respectively. Yellow means
that neither H+0 nor H
−
0 are rejected. In the grey region, the two Murphy
diagrams identically coincide.
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f2t stand for one of the three considered forecasts, At, Bt or Ct. In each pairwise com-
parison, we choose f1t to be inferior to f2t such that we expect a non-negative difference
of the corresponding Murphy diagrams. Indeed, only in the comparison between Bob
and Anne, there are some k where sˆ250,f1(k)− sˆ250,f2(k) < 0. For the remaining regions
and situations, the Murphy diagrams behave consistently with our expectations.
For all three pairwise comparisons, one can nicely recognise the region where the respec-
tive two forecasts differ, resulting in a positive score difference depicted in blue. This
bluish region seems to correspond to a blurred version of the boundary of the considered
risk measure. Interestingly, while these regions illustrating positive score differences are
similar in shape and location for the two pairs involving Celia, this region seems to be
slightly translated to the upper right corner in the comparison between Anne and Bob.
Quite intuitively, the magnitude of the score difference with a maximum of approxi-
mately 0.05 is smaller in the joust between the two ideal forecasts issued by Bob and
Anne in comparison to the situations involving the sign-reversed Celia where the max-
imal difference between the Murphy diagrams is larger than 0.15. We have performed
this experiment several times and observed that the stylised facts are qualitatively sta-
ble. For transparency reasons, we have depicted the first experiment performed, but we
report some more experiments in Appendix C.
In the right panel of Figure 2 we depict the results of pointwise comparative backtests
using the traffic-light illustration suggested in Fissler et al. (2016), which is akin to the
three-zone approach of the Bank for International Settlements (2013, pp. 103–108). That
is, we perform a Diebold-Mariano test using the elementary score SR,k for each k in a
grid of [−5, 5]2. This means, we would like to see whether the superiority of the forecasts
f1t is recognised at a significance level of 0.05 deploying the two possible one-sided null
hypotheses H+0 : f1  f2 and H−0 : f1  f2, using the notation introduced in the previous
subsection. If for a certain k the null H+0 is rejected deeming f2 significantly superior to
f1, we colour the corresponding k in green. Similarly, if the null H
−
0 is rejected, consid-
ering f1 to be superior to f2, we illustrate k in red. For all k in the yellow region, none
of the two nulls is rejected, meaning that the procedure is indecisive at the significance
level 0.05. Finally, the grey area corresponds to those points where the score difference
is constantly zero for all t = 1, . . . , N . Due to the vanishing variance, a Diebold-Mariano
test is apparently not possible there. But clearly, this still means that the two forecasts
are just equally good in that region.
The specific results nicely correspond to the situations obtained in the left panel of Fig-
ure 2. For all three pairwise comparisons and for k close to the four corners of the area
[−5, 5]2, the score differences identically vanish, resulting in a grey colouration. Again,
in all three cases, there is a “continuous” behaviour in that the grey region adjoins a
yellow stripe before turning into a fairly broad green stripe. For the comparisons involv-
ing Celia, clearly using an inferior predictive distribution to both Anne’s and Bob’s, it
is reassuring that a substantial region is coloured in green. In this region, the procedure
is decisive, deeming Celia significantly inferior to Anne and to Bob. Moreover, for this
particular simulation, there is no red region. The situation comparing the two ideal
forecasters Anne and Bob is somewhat more involved. While most of the previous ob-
servations also apply to that situation, there is a small red stripe close to the upper right
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corner. For k in that region and for this particular simulation, this means that Bob’s
forecasts outperform Anne’s ones. While this observation is somewhat unexpected, it
reflects the finite sample nature of the simulation, rendering such outcomes possible.
Having a look at some more experiments, the results of which are again reported in
Appendix C, shows that this red region is not stable over different simulations (which
would clearly violate the sensitivity of consistent scoring functions with respect to in-
creasing information sets established in Holzmann and Eulert (2014)), but it moves and
occasionally also vanishes (on the region [−5, 5]2 considered). Interestingly, in all events
with a red region present, this red region was still roughly located in a similar area.
8. Discussion
As mentioned in the introduction, the aims and novel contributions of this paper are
two-fold. On the one hand, we introduce a principled framework for the assessment
of forecasts for set-valued quantities: an exhaustive notion where forecasts specify the
entire set of interest versus a selective notion where forecasters are content with issuing
a single point in the set of interest. We unveil the structural connection between these
two alternative notions, notably their mutual exclusivity (Corollary 2.13). The other
main contribution consists of establishing selective identifiability results in Theorem 4.1
and exhaustive elicitability results in Theorem 4.9 for systemic risk measures sensitive
with respect to capital allocations. Notably, the construction of consistent exhaustive
scoring functions relies on a mixture representation of easily computable elementary
scores, which opens the way to the diagnostic tool of Murphy diagrams.
While the structural insights and the framework for evaluating forecasts for set-valued
quantities might help to enhance the academic and applied avenue of research in that area
(see Subsection 2.5), we would like to briefly outline specific fields where the identifiability
and elicitability results of this paper can be of advantage.
Backtesting. A strictly consistent exhaustive scoring function SR for a systemic
risk measure R can be used for comparative backtests of competing exhaustive forecasts,
that is, set-valued forecasts, as described in Fissler et al. (2016) and Nolde and Ziegel
(2017); see also Subsection 7. More precisely, having competing forecasts A1, . . . , AN ∈
P(Rd;Rd+), B1, . . . , BN ∈ P(Rd;Rd+), and verifying observations of the gains and losses
of the financial system Y1, . . . , YN ∈ Rd, one can consider a properly normalised version
of the test statistic
1
N
N∑
t=1
SR(At, Yt)− SR(Bt, Yt)
to assess which forecast sequence is superior under SR.
On the other hand, the fact that one can construct oriented selective identifica-
tion functions for risk measures might open the way to one-sided traditional backtests
(Nolde & Ziegel, 2017, Subsection 2.21). That is, if one has a sequence of vector-valued
predictions for capital requirements k1, . . . , kN ∈ Rd along with verifying observations
Y1, . . . , YN ∈ Rd, one might wonder if the forecasted capital requirements are adequate
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to eliminate the risk of the financial system under R. That means, we would like to
judge if kt ∈ R(Yt) for all t = 1, . . . , N with a certain level of certainty α. If VR0 is
an oriented strict selective identification function for R0, this amounts to testing the
one-sided null hypothesis
H0 : E[VR0(kt, Yt)] ≤ 0 for all t = 1, . . . , N.
Under suitable mixing conditions, one can construct an (asymptotic) level α test for this
null hypothesis by considering a rescaled version of the test statistic
1
N
N∑
t=1
VR0(kt, Yt) .
Note that from a regulatory perspective, testing this one-sided null hypothesis is more
sensible than testing the two-sided null
H ′0 : E[VR0(kt, Yt)] = 0 for all t = 1, . . . , N.
Indeed, this corresponds to assessing whether ρ(Λ(Yt+kt)) = 0. However, overestimating
the financial requirements to make the system acceptable is even more prudent from a
regulatory angle.
M-Estimation. If a systemic risk measure R is exhaustively elicitable, one can
make inference for it in the form of M -estimation (Huber & Ronchetti, 2009). That is,
if one has a sample Y1, . . . , YN ∈ Rd of stationary observations fulfilling sufficient mixing
conditions, one might estimate the set-valued risk measure R(Y ) ∈ F(Rd;Rd+), where Y
has the same distribution as the observations, via
R̂(Y ) = arg min
A∈F(Rd;Rd+)
1
N
N∑
t=1
SR(A, Yt), (8.1)
where SR : F(Rd;Rd+) × Rd → R is a strictly consistent exhaustive scoring function for
R. Under suitable conditions, the M -estimator R̂(Y ) at (8.1) is consistent for R(Y ).
However, computationally, the optimisation problem at (8.1) might be rather expensive,
if feasible at all. The reason is that one needs to optimise over the collection of all closed
upper sets of Rd.
Regression. A closely connected concept to the notion of M -estimation is regression
where it is possible to bypass the complication to optimise over a collection of sets.
Consider a time series (Xt, Yt)t∈N. Sticking to the usual denomination, let Yt denote the
response variable, taking values in Rd, and let Xt be a p-dimensional vector of regressors.
The regressors might consist of quantities which seem relevant to the systemic risk of
the financial system. Examples might consist of macroeconomic quantities such as GDP,
unemployment, inflation, net-investments etc. Let Θ ⊆ Rq be a parameter space and
let M : Rp × Θ → F(Rd;Rd+) be a parametric model taking values in the collection of
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closed upper subsets of Rd. Suppose the model is correctly specified in that there exists
a unique parameter θ0 ∈ Θ such that
R(FYt|Xt) = M(Xt, θ0) P-a.s. for all t ∈ N. (8.2)
Here, R : Md → F(Rd;Rd+) is a law-invariant risk measure of the form at (3.1) satis-
fying the conditions of Theorem 4.9(iii). Further, suppose that the (regular version of
the) conditional distribution FYt|Xt of Yt given Xt is an element of Md0 almost surely,
where we use the notation of Theorem 4.9. Note that the time series does not need
to be strongly stationary, but only the conditional distribution FYt|Xt needs to satisfy
the ‘semi-parametric stationarity condition’ specified via (8.2). Let SR,pi be a strictly
Md0-consistent exhaustive scoring function for R. Then, under certain mixing and inte-
grability assumptions specified in White (2001, Corollary 3.48) one yields the following
Law of Large Numbers
1
N
N∑
t=1
{
SR,pi (M(Xt, θ), Yt)−E [SR,pi (M(Xt, θ), Yt)]
}→ 0 P-a.s. as N →∞
for all θ ∈ Θ. It is essentially a uniform version (in the parameter θ) of this Law of Large
Numbers result which yields the consistency for the empirical estimator
θ̂N := arg min
θ∈Θ
1
N
N∑
t=1
SR,pi (M(Xt, θ), Yt) (8.3)
for θ0; see van der Vaart (1998), Huber and Ronchetti (2009) or Nolde and Ziegel (2017)
for details. The advantage of this regression approach in comparison to M -estimation is
that the optimisation at (8.3) needs to be performed over a subset Θ of Rq only (which
is often assumed to be compact). This makes the result computationally a lot more
feasible than the optimisation procedure over a collection of upper sets.12
Besides the usual practical challenge of constructing reasonable parametric models M
to model the systemic risk of a financial system Yt given regressors Xt, we see some in-
teresting theoretical problems related to this regression framework. While, under correct
model specification given at (8.2), any strictly consistent scoring function SR,pi induces
a consistent estimator θ̂N at (8.3), the estimator will generally depend on the choice of
SR,pi (or pi) in finite samples. Moreover, the efficiency of the estimator θ̂N , expressed in
terms of the asymptotic variance of
√
N(θ̂N − θ0), will depend on the choice of SR,pi,
suggesting an interesting optimality criterion for SR,pi.
A very modern and interesting approach circumventing this issue is to perform regres-
sion simultaneously with respect to the class of all consistent scoring functions (or a
reasonably large subclass), which is explored in the recent paper Jordan et al. (2019).
To perform this efficiently, the mixture representation of scoring functions in terms of
elementary scores might prove beneficial. We defer this interesting problem to future
research.
12In other words, M -estimation can be considered as a special instance of regression where the regressor
Xt is constant and where Θ corresponds to F(Rd;Rd+).
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Appendix
A. Systemic risk measures insensitive to capital allocations
In this appendix, we state some elicitability and identifiability results for systemic risk
measures Rins defined at (3.2) which are insensitive with respect to capital allocation.
They are similar to some results of Section 4, however often less technically involved. To
this end, we first introduce the following law-invariant risk measures connected to Rins:
r : Yd → R, Y 7→ r(Y ) = ρ(Λ(Y )), (A.1)
Rins0 : Yd → 2R
d
, Y 7→ Rins0 (Y ) = {k ∈ Rd | ρ(Λ(Y ) + k¯) = 0}, (A.2)
where we recall the shorthand k¯ =
∑d
i=1 ki for some vector k = (k1, . . . , kd) ∈ Rd. Due
to the cash-invariance of ρ, Rins0 is a bijection of r. Note that R
ins is always a closed
half-space above the hyperplane with normal (1, . . . , 1)> ∈ Rd and Rins0 corresponds
to its topological boundary. This implies a one-to-one relationship between Rins0 and
Rins. Thanks to these facts, one can make use of an extension of the so called revelation
principle which originates from Osband’s (1985) seminal thesis.
Proposition A.1 (Revelation principle). Let T : Md → R be an identifiable and elic-
itable functional, g : Rd → R some map, and h : A→ R, A ⊆ 2Rd a bijection with inverse
h−1. Then the following assertions hold true:
(i) T : Md → R is identifiable if and only if Th−1 = h−1 ◦ T : Md → A is exhaustively
identifiable. The function V : R × Rd → R is a strict Md-identification function
for T if and only if
Vh−1 : A× Rd → R, (B, y) 7→ V (h−1(B), y)
is a strict Md-identification function for Th−1 = h−1 ◦ T : Md → A.
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(ii) T : Md → R is elicitable if and only if Th−1 = h−1 ◦ T : Md → A is exhaustively
elicitable. The function S : R×Rd → R is a strictlyMd-consistent scoring function
for T if and only if
Sh−1 : A× Rd → R, (B, y) 7→ S(h−1(B), y)
is a strictly Md-consistent exhaustive scoring function for Th−1 = h−1 ◦ T : Md →
A.
(iii) If S : R× Rd → R is a (strictly) consistent scoring function for T , then
Sg−1 : Rd × Rd → R, (x, y) 7→ S(g(x), y)
is a (strictly) Md-consistent selective scoring function for Tg−1 = g−1 ◦ T : Md →
2R
d
.
(iv) If V : R× Rd → R is a (strict) Md-identification function for T , then
Vg−1 : Rd × Rd → R, (x, y) 7→ V (g(x), y)
is a (strict) selective Md-identification function for Tg−1.
(v) If V : R×Rd → R is an oriented strict identification function for T and g is strictly
increasing with respect to the componentwise order, then Vg−1 : Rd ×Rd → R is an
oriented strict selective Md-identification function for Tg−1 in the following sense:
V¯g−1(x, Y )

< 0, if x ∈ (g−1({T (F )})− Rd+) \ g−1({T (F )})
= 0, if x ∈ g−1({T (F )})
> 0, if x ∈ (g−1({T (F )}) + Rd+) \ g−1({T (F )}).
Proof. (i)–(ii) These statements are a special case of Lemma 2.3.2 in Fissler (2017).
(iii) This is a special case of Lemma 2.3.3 in Fissler (2017).
(iv) Let F ∈ Md. If Tg−1(F ) = g−1({T (F )}) = ∅, there is nothing to show. Assume
that x ∈ Tg−1(F ). Then we have g(x) = T (F ) and thus V¯g−1(x, F ) = V¯ (g(x), F ) =
0. Moreover, if x′ /∈ Tg−1(F ), we have g(x′) 6= T (F ) and thus if V is a strict
identification function for T , we have V¯g−1(x
′, F ) = V¯ (g(x′), F ) 6= 0.
(v) From the previous part we already have V¯g−1(x, F ) = 0 for x ∈ g−1({T (F )}).
Now assume x ∈ (g−1({T (F )}) − Rd+) \ g−1({T (F )}). Then there is some x′ ∈
g−1({T (F )}) such that x ≤ x′ componentwise and x 6= x′ and thus g(x) < g(x′) =
T (F ). Therefore, using the orientation of V , we get V¯g−1(x, F ) < 0. The last part
follows by similar considerations.
Lemma A.2. Let ρ : M→ R be identifiable and elicitable with a strictM-identification
function Vρ : R × R → R and a strictly M-consistent scoring function Sρ : R × R → R.
Then the following assertions hold for r : Md → R defined at (A.1):
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(i) r is identifiable and
Vr : R× Rd → R, (x, y) 7→ Vρ(x,Λ(y)) (A.3)
is a strict Md-identification function for r.
(ii) If Vρ : R × R → R is an oriented strict M-identification function for ρ, then Vr
defined at (A.3) is oriented for r.
(iii) r is elicitable and
Sr : R× Rd → R, (x, y) 7→ Sr(k, y) = Sρ(x,Λ(y))
is a strictly Md-consistent scoring function for r.
Proof. Obvious.
Corollary A.3. Let ρ : M→ R be identifiable and elicitable with a strictM-identification
function Vρ : R × R → R and a strictly M-consistent scoring function Sρ : R × R → R.
Then the following assertions hold for Rins defined at (3.2) and Rins0 defined at (A.2):
(i) Rins is exhaustively identifiable and exhaustively elicitable. Define k¯min(B) =
min
{
k¯ | k ∈ B} for B ∈ A where A is the collection of all closed half-spaces above
the hyperplane with normal (1, . . . , 1)> ∈ Rd. Then
VRins : A× Rd → R, (B, y) 7→ Vρ(k¯min(B), y),
SRins : A× Rd → R, (B, y) 7→ Sρ(k¯min(B), y)
are a strict exhaustive Md-identification function and a strictly Md-consistent ex-
haustive scoring function for Rins, respectively.
(ii) Rins0 is selectively identifiable and
VRins0
: Rd × Rd → R, (k, y) 7→ VRins0 (k, y) = Vρ(k¯,Λ(y))
is a strict selectiveMd-identification function for Rins0 . Moreover, if Vρ is oriented,
VRins0
is oriented in the sense defined at (4.2).
(iii) Rins0 is selectively elicitable and
SRins0
: Rd × Rd → R, (k, y) 7→ SRins0 (k, y) = Sρ(k¯,Λ(y))
is a strictly Md-consistent selective scoring function for Rins0 .
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Proposition A.1 and Lemma A.2.
Proposition A.4. Let ρ : Y → R be a risk measure, Λ: Rd → R an aggregation func-
tion and r : Yd → R as in (A.1). Assume that there exists a measurable right inverse
η : Λ(Rd)→ Rd such that Λ ◦ η = idR, and for any X ∈ Y, η(X) belongs to Yd. Then ρ
is identifiable if and only if r is identifiable.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.8.
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B. Proofs of the main part
B.1. Proofs of Section 2
Proof of Proposition 2.7. Let SM (SM1) be the class of strictly M-consistent (M1-
consistent) scoring functions for T . It holds that
SM ⊆ SM1 = S ′M1 = S ′M.
However, any S′ ∈ S ′M1 fails to be strictly M-consistent for T . Hence, SM = ∅.
Proof of Proposition 2.10. Let F0, F1 ∈M, λ ∈ (0, 1) and define Fλ = (1− λ)F0 + λF1.
Let S : Asel × O → R∗ be a strictly M-consistent selective scoring function for T . If
T (F0) ∩ T (F1) = ∅, there is nothing to show. So let t ∈ T (F0) ∩ T (F1) 6= ∅. Moreover,
let x ∈ Asel. Note that for i ∈ {0, 1}
S¯(x, Fi)− S¯(t, Fi)
{
= 0, if x ∈ T (Fi)
> 0, if x /∈ T (Fi)
due to the strict M-consistency of S. This implies that
S¯(x, Fλ)− S¯(t, Fλ) = (1− λ)
(
S¯(x, F0)− S¯(t, F0)
)
+ λ
(
S¯(x, F1)− S¯(t, F1)
)
(B.1){
= 0, if x ∈ T (F0) ∩ T (F1)
> 0, if x /∈ T (F0) ∩ T (F1).
The identity in (B.1) stems from the fact that the expected score S¯(·, ·) behaves “linearly”
in its second argument, which is the integration measure. Again, invoking the strictM-
consistency of S, the assertion follows.
Proof of Theorem 2.12. Assume S is a strictlyM-consistent exhaustive scoring function
for T . Let F,G ∈M such that ∅ 6= T (G) ( T (F ). Then
S¯(T (F ), F )− S¯(T (G), F ) < 0 < S¯(T (F ), G)− S¯(T (G), G).
For any λ ∈ (0, 1) the selective CxLS* property implies that T ((1− λ)F + λG) = T (G).
Then there is a sufficiently small λ0 ∈ (0, 1) such that
S¯(T (F ), (1− λ0)F + λ0G)− S¯(T (G), (1− λ0)F + λ0G)
= (1− λ0)
(
S¯(T (F ), F )− S¯(T (G), F ))+ λ0(S¯(T (F ), G)− S¯(T (G), G)) < 0,
which violates the strict M-consistency.
Proof of Corollary 2.13. Implication (i) is an immediate consequence of Proposition 2.10
and Theorem 2.12. Implication (ii) is merely the contraposition of (i).
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Proof of Proposition 2.16. Let Tsel : F → A be a selection of T and suppose S : A×O→
R∗ is a strictly M-consistent scoring function for Tsel. Let F,G,H ∈ M satisfy (2.7).
If t0 and t1 are topologically distinguishable, the selective CxLS* property implies that
for any λ ∈ (0, 1) we have that t1 = Tsel((1− λ)F + λG) and t2 = Tsel((1− λ)F + λH).
Then, for t0 = Tsel(F ) we have that t0 6= t1 or t0 6= t2. Without loss of generality, assume
t0 6= t1. Then the map γ : [0, 1]→ A, λ 7→ Tsel((1−λ)F +λG) is not continuous,13 which
shows that Tsel is not mixture-continuous. Moreover, γ is neither injective nor constant,
such that Lemma B.1 in Fissler and Ziegel (2019c) implies that Tsel is not identifiable.
Finally, the strict M-consistency of S for Tsel implies that for all λ ∈ (0, 1)
S¯(t0, F )− S¯(t1, F ) < 0 < S¯(t0, (1− λ)F + λG)− S¯(t1, (1− λ)F + λG).
This contradicts the elementary fact that the map [0, 1] 3 λ 7→ S¯(t0, (1 − λ)F + λG) −
S¯(t1, (1− λ)F + λG) is continuous (and even affine).
B.2. Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Theorem 4.1. (i) Let Vρ : R × R → R be a strict M-identification function
for ρ. That means for all Y ∈ Yd with distribution F ∈Md, for all k ∈ Rd and for
all x ∈ R, one has that
EF
[
Vρ(x,Λ(Y + k))
]
= 0 ⇐⇒ x = ρ(Λ(Y + k)). (B.2)
Setting x = 0 in (B.2) yields
EF
[
Vρ(0,Λ(Y + k))
]
= 0 ⇐⇒ 0 = ρ(Λ(Y + k)) ⇐⇒ k ∈ R0(Y ),
which holds in particular for R0(Y ) = ∅. Therefore VR0(k, y) = Vρ(0,Λ(y + k)) is
a strict selective M-identification function for R0.
(ii) Now assume that Vρ : R × R → R is an oriented strict M-identification function
for ρ. That means for all Y ∈ Yd with distribution F ∈Md, for all k ∈ Rd and for
all x ∈ R, one has that
EF
[
Vρ(x,Λ(Y + k))
]
< 0, if x < ρ(Λ(Y + k))
= 0, if x = ρ(Λ(Y + k))
> 0, if x > ρ(Λ(Y + k)).
(B.3)
Setting x = 0 in (B.3) yields the claim.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. The proof follows along the lines of the proof of Theorem 3.2
in Fissler and Ziegel (2016); cf. Osband (1985). The dimensionality of x does not play
13Let U ⊂ A be an open set such that t0 ∈ U , but t1 /∈ U . Then γ−1(U) = {0}, which is not open in
[0, 1].
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Figure 3: A graphical illustration of the proof of Proposition 4.6 for dimension d = 2.
Suppose the blue region corresponds to the correctly specified risk measure
R(F ). In the left picture, EARw(F ) is a singleton, containing only point A.
Point B corresponds to case (i), whereas points C and D are examples of case
(ii) for points that are not in EARw(F ). In the right picture, EARw(F ) = ∅.
For any k ∈ Rd there is some x ∈ w⊥ such that V¯R0(k + x, F ) > 0.
any role in the proof. As our identification functions map to R, we use k = 1 in the
proof of Theorem 3.2 of Fissler and Ziegel (2016). The assumption on the existence
of F1, F2 ∈ Md such that the signs of V¯R0 are different plus the convexity of Md are
equivalent to Assumption (V1) in Fissler and Ziegel (2016). If we replace ∇S¯(x, F ) by
V¯ ′(x, F ), we obtain that there is a function h : A→ R such that
V¯ ′(x, F ) = h(x)V¯ (x, F )
for all x ∈ A and all F ∈ Md. Since the matrix BG in the proof will be a 2 × 3 matrix
of rank 1 for any x ∈ A, h(x) has to be nonzero for all x ∈ A.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. Let F ∈ Md and EARw(F ) 6= ∅. Note that for any k ∈ Rd,
V¯EARw(k, F ) evaluates V¯R0( · , F ) : Rd → R on the hyperplane orthogonal to w containing
k. Since EARw(F ) ⊆ R0(F ), k ∈ EARw(F ) implies that V¯R0(k, F ) = 0. The orientation
of VR0 , and the facts that EARw(F ) is the intersection of R(F ) with the supporting
hyperplane for R(F ) orthogonal to w and that R(F ) is an upper set imply that V¯R0(k+
x, F ) = V¯EARw(k, F )(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ w⊥. If k /∈ EARw(F ), there are two possibilities:
(i) The orthogonal hyperplane containing k has an empty intersection with R(F ) such
that V¯R0(k + x, F ) < 0 for all x ∈ w⊥.
(ii) The orthogonal hyperplane containing k has a non-empty intersection with R(F ) \
R0(Y ) such that there is some x ∈ w⊥ with V¯R0(k + x, F ) > 0.
Now let EARw(F ) = ∅. If R(F ) = ∅, (4.7) holds trivially. If R(F ) is non-empty,
EARw(F ) is only empty if there is no supporting hyperplane for R(F ) orthogonal to
w. Then for any k ∈ Rd, there are x1, x2 ∈ w⊥ such that V¯EARw(k, F )(x1) > 0 and
V¯EARw(k, F )(x2) < 0, as depicted in the right part of Figure 3.
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Proof of Proposition 4.8. The ‘only if’ part is a special case of Theorem 4.1. For the ‘if’
part, assume VR0 : Rd × Rd → R is a strict selective Md-identification function for R0.
For any Y ∈ Yd it holds that E[VR0(0, Y )] = 0 ⇔ 0 ∈ R0(Y ) ⇔ ρ(Λ(Y )) = 0. Then we
obtain that for any s ∈ R and any X ∈ Y
ρ(X) = s ⇐⇒ ρ(X + s) = 0 ⇐⇒ E[VR0(0, η(X + s))] = 0.
Thus ρ is identifiable with a strict selective M-identification function Vρ : R × R → R,
Vρ(s, x) = VR0(0, η(x+ s)).
For the proof of Theorem 4.9, we need the following lemma.
Lemma B.1. Let A1, A2 ∈ F(Rd;Rd+). Then, the symmetric difference A14A2 =
(A1 \A2) ∪ (A2 \A1) is empty if and only if its interior, int(A14A2), is empty.
Proof of Lemma B.1. If A14A2 = ∅ it is clear that int(A14A2) = ∅.
Assume that there is an x ∈ A14A2. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
x ∈ A1 \ A2. If x ∈ int(A1 \ A2), we are done. Hence, let x ∈ (A1 \ A2) \ int(A1 \ A2)
which implies that x ∈ ∂(A1 \ A2), where ∂(A1 \ A2) denotes the boundary of A1 \ A2.
It holds that ∂(A1 \A2) = ∂(A1 ∩Ac2) ⊆ ∂A1 ∪∂(Ac2) = ∂A1 ∪∂A2. But since ∂A2 ⊆ A2
and x ∈ A1 \A2, it follows that x ∈ ∂A1 \A2.
Due to the definition of the boundary, this means that for all ε > 0 it holds that
Bε(x) ∩ A1 6= ∅, where Bε(x) is the open ball with centre x and radius ε. Assume that
for all ε > 0 we have Bε(x) ∩ A2 6= ∅, then x ∈ A¯2 = A2, which is a contradiction
to the assumption that x ∈ ∂A1 \ A2. That means there exists an ε0 > 0 such that
Bε0(x) ∩ A2 = ∅. Moreover, since A1 is an upper set, x + Rd++ is a non-empty open
subset of A1. Furthermore, we see that Bε0(x) ∩ (x+Rd++) is a non-empty open subset
of A1 which is disjoint from A2. This means that int(A1 \A2) 6= ∅.
Proof of Theorem 4.9. (i) Let k ∈ Rd, A ∈ P̂(Rd;Rd+) and F ∈Md. A direct calcula-
tion yields that
S¯R,k(A,F )− S¯R,k(R(F ), F ) =
(
1R(F )\A(k)− 1A\R(F )(k)
)
V¯R0(k, F ) ≥ 0, (B.4)
where the last inequality is a direct consequence of the weak form of orientation
given at (4.10). The non-negativity of SR,k follows from the Md-consistency, ex-
ploiting that δy ∈Md for all y ∈ Rd and SR,k(A, y) ≥ SR,k(R(y), y) = 0.
(ii) This is a direct consequence of the non-negativity and consistency of the scores
SR,k.
(iii) Let F ∈ Md, and A∗ := R(F ), A ∈ F(Rd;Rd+) with A 6= A∗. Assume that
S¯R,pi(A,F ), S¯R,pi(A
∗, F ) <∞ (otherwise, there is nothing to show). Using Fubini’s
Theorem, we obtain
S¯R,pi(A,F )− S¯R,pi(A∗, F ) =
∫
A∗\A
V¯R0(k, F )pi(dk)−
∫
A\A∗
V¯R0(k, F )pi(dk).
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Then Lemma B.1 yields that int(A\A∗) 6= ∅ or int(A∗ \A) 6= ∅. If int(A\A∗) 6= ∅,
the fact that V¯ (·, F ) is strictly negative on (A∗)c and the assumption that pi assigns
positive mass to any non-empty open set in B(Rd) implies that∫
A\A∗
V¯R0(k, F )pi(dk) < 0,
which implies that S¯R,pi(A,F )− S¯R,pi(A∗, F ) > 0.
Assume int(A∗ \ A) 6= ∅. The boundary ∂A∗ = R0(F ) = {k ∈ Rd | V¯R0(k, F ) = 0}
is a closed set. That means that int(A∗\A)\∂A∗ is open and non-empty. Moreover
V¯R0(·, F ) is strictly positive on int(A∗ \A) \ ∂A∗. Hence,∫
A∗\A
V¯R0(k, F )pi(dk) ≥
∫
int(A∗\A)\∂A∗
V¯R0(k, F )pi(dk) > 0,
which implies that S¯R,pi(A,F )− S¯R,pi(A∗, F ) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.11. For the first part of the Proposition, it is sufficient to show
order-sensitivity for the elementary scores SR,k given at (4.11). Let A ⊆ B ⊆ R(F ).
Then, for any k ∈ Rd,
S¯R,k(A,F )− S¯R,k(B,F ) = 1B\A(k)V¯R0(k, F ) ≥ 0,
due to the orientation given at (4.10). On the other hand, for A ⊇ B ⊇ R(F ) we obtain
that
S¯R,k(A,F )− S¯R,k(B,F ) = −1A\B(k)V¯R0(k, F ) ≥ 0,
where the inequality follows again by (4.10).
The second part of the proposition follows along the lines of the proof of Theorem
4.9(iii).
B.3. Proofs of Section 5
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Assume that ρ is a positively homogeneous scalar risk measure and
Λ is positively homogeneous of degree b ∈ R. Let c > 0 and Y ∈ Yd.
R(cY ) =
{
k ∈ Rd | ρ(Λ(cY + k)) ≤ 0
}
=
{
k ∈ Rd | ρ
(
cbΛ (Y + k/c)
)
≤ 0
}
=
{
k ∈ Rd | cbρ (Λ (X + k/c)) ≤ 0
}
=
{
k ∈ Rd | ρ (Λ (X + k/c)) ≤ 0
}
=c
{
k ∈ Rd|ρ(Λ(X + k)) ≤ 0
}
= cR(Y ).
Mutatis mutandis, the proof works also for Rins.
Proof of Lemma 5.3. (i) Let y, k, l ∈ Rd. Then
VR0(k + l, y − l) = Vρ(0,Λ(k + l + y − l)) = Vρ(0,Λ(k + y)) = VR0(k, y).
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(ii) Let V ′R0 be another translation invariant strict Md-identification function for R0.
Using Proposition 4.4 there is a non-vanishing function h : Rd → R such that
V¯ ′R0(x, F ) = h(x)V¯R0(x, F ) for all x ∈ Rd and for all F ∈ Md. One can show that
h is constant along the lines of the proof of Proposition 4.7(ii) in Fissler and Ziegel
(2019c).
(iii) Let c > 0, k, y ∈ Rd. Then
VR0(ck, cy) = Vρ(0,Λ(ck + cy)) = Vρ(0, c
bΛ(k + y))
= cabVρ(0,Λ(k + y)) = c
abVR0(k, y).
Proof of Proposition 5.5. First observe that VR0(k, y) = Vρ(0,Λ(y + k)) is an oriented
selective translation invariant strictMd-identification function for R0, invoking Lemma
5.3(i) and Theorem 4.1. Then a direct computation yields that
SR,k(A+ l, y − l) = SR,k−l(A, l) (B.5)
for all A ∈ 2Rd , y, l ∈ Rd. Therefore, (B.5) and the translation invariance of the Lebesgue
measure show part (i).
For part (ii), assume that S is of the form at (4.12) and is translation invariant where,
invoking the discussion above, we may assume without loss of generality that the ele-
mentary scores S are based on the translation invariant identification function VR0 . For
l ∈ Rd define the measure pil(A) = pi(A+ l) for A ∈ B(Rd). Note that since S is assumed
to be finite this implies that the score differences are well-defined and are translation
invariant as well. For A ⊆ B this implies that for any l ∈ R∫
B\A
VR0(z, y)pil(dz) =
∫
B\A
VR0(z, y)pi(dz).
Any set of the form I = [a1, b1)× · · · × [ad, bd), ai, bi ∈ R, ai ≤ bi, can be represented as
B \ A for some A,B ∈ F(Rd;Rd+) with A ⊆ B. The system of these sets I, however, is
a generator of B(Rd), and we conclude that for any l ∈ Rd
νy,l(D) :=
∫
D
VR0(z, y)pil(dz) =
∫
D
VR0(z, y)pi(dz) =: νy(D). (B.6)
for all D ∈ B(Rd). For each D ∈ B(Rd) we obtain the decomposition (depending on y)
D = D+y ∪D−y ∪D0y, where D−y = D∩R(y)c, D0y = D∩R0(y) and D+y = D∩R(y)\R0(y).
Hence, (B.6) and the strictness of the identification function VR0 imply that for E = D
+
y
or E = D−y
pil(E) =
∫
E
1
VR0(z, y)
νy,l(dz) =
∫
E
1
VR0(z, y)
νy(dz) = pi(E). (B.7)
The translation equivariance of R and Assumption (2) imply that (B.7) holds for all
E ∈ B(Rd). That means that pi = γLd for some γ ≥ 0.
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Proof of Proposition 5.6. Assume that VR0 is an oriented strict selectiveMd-identification
function for R0 which is positively homogeneous of degree a ∈ R. A direct computation
yields that
SR,k(cA, cy) = c
aSR, k
c
(A, y) (B.8)
for all A ∈ 2Rd , y ∈ Rd and c > 0. If pi is positively homogeneous of degree b ∈ R, (B.8)
implies that SR,pi in (5.2) is positively homogeneous of degree a+ b.
For part (ii), assume that S is of the form at (4.12) and is positively homogeneous of
degree a + b. For c ∈ R define the measure pic(A) = pi(cA) for A ∈ B(Rd). Note that
since S is assumed to be finite, the positive homogeneity of S implies that the score
differences are well-defined and are also positively homogeneous of degree a + b. For
A ⊆ B a direct computation shows that for any c > 0∫
B\A
VR0(z, y)pic(dz) = c
b
∫
B\A
VR0(z, y)pi(dz).
With the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 5.5, we conclude that
νy,c(D) :=
∫
D
VR0(z, y)pic(dz) = c
b
∫
D
VR0(z, y)pi(dz) =: c
bνy(D)
for all D ∈ B(Rd) and
pic(E) =
∫
E
1
VR0(z, y)
νy,c(dz) =
∫
E
1
VR0(z, y)
cbνy(dz) = c
bpi(E) (B.9)
for E = D ∩ R(y)c or E = D ∩ R(y) \ R0(y). Finally, the translation equivariance of R
and Assumption (2) imply that (B.9) holds for all E ∈ B(Rd). That means pi is positively
homogeneous of degree b.
B.4. Proofs of Section 6
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Let F ∈Md and k ∈ Rd. Then
U¯2(T
V aRα(F ), k, F ) =
1
α
EF [Λ(Y + k)1{Λ(Y + k) ≤ −T V aRα(F )(k)}]
+
1
α
V aRα(Λ(Y + k))
(
FΛ(Y+k)(−V aRα(Λ(Y + k)))− α
)
= −ESα(Λ(Y + k))
< 0, if k /∈ RESα(F )
= 0, if k ∈ RESα0 (F )
> 0, if k ∈ RESα(F ) \RESα0 (F ),
where FΛ(Y+k) is the distribution function of Λ(Y + k). Under Assumption (3) it holds
that U¯1(T
V aRα(F ), k, F ) = 0. Therefore, one ends up with the second assertion.
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Proof of Theorem 6.2. (i) Let F ∈Md, v ∈ RRd , A ∈ P̂(Rd;Rd+) and v∗ = T V aRα(F ),
A∗ = RESα(F ) and k ∈ Rd. If S¯k(v,A, F ) = ∞ there is nothing to show. So we
assume that S¯k(v,A, F ) is finite. Consider
S¯k(v,A, F )− S¯k(v∗, A, F ) = 1A(k)
[− U¯2(v, k, F ) + U2(v∗, k, F )]
= 1A(k)EF
[
Sα,id(−v(k),Λ(Y + k))− Sα,id(−v∗(k),Λ(Y + k))
] ≥ 0,
since Sα,id is consistent for the α-quantile. If S¯k(v
∗, A, F ) = ∞ we are done.
Otherwise, consider
S¯k(v
∗, A, F )− S¯k(v∗, A∗, F ) =
(
1A∗\A(k)− 1A\A∗(k)
)
U¯2(v, k, F ) ≥ 0,
where the inequality follows from (6.4). The non-negativity follows from the con-
sistency and the fact that Sk(T
V aRα(δy), R
ESα(δy), y) = 0.
(ii) Due to part (i), the score S0,pi2 isMd-consistent for (T V aRα , RESα) : Md → RR
d ×
P̂(Rd;Rd+). Since Sα,gz is a consistent selective scoring function for the α-quantile,
the assertion follows invoking Fubini’s Theorem.
(iii) Let F ∈ Md0, v ∈ C(Rd;R), A ∈ F(Rd;Rd+) and v∗ = T V aRα(F ), A∗ = RESα(F ).
If v 6= v∗ then K = {k ∈ Rd | v(k) 6= v∗(k)} 6= ∅ is open. If S¯pi1,pi2(v,A, F ) = ∞
there is nothing to show. Otherwise
EF [Spi1,pi2(v,A, Y )− Spi1,pi2(v∗, A, Y )]
≥
∫
K
EF
[
Sα,gk(−v(k),Λ(Y + k))− Sα,gk(−v∗(k),Λ(Y + k))
]
pi1(dk)
+
1
α
∫
A∩K
EF
[
Sα,id(−v(k),Λ(Y + k))− Sα,id(−v∗(k),Λ(Y + k))
]
pi2(dk) > 0,
where the first integral is strictly positive and the second one is non-negative (and
strictly positive if and only if pi2(A ∩K) > 0).
If A 6= A∗, then EF [Spi1,pi2(v∗, A, Y ) − Spi1,pi2(v∗, A∗, Y )] > 0, which follows with
similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 4.9(iii).
C. Further simulation results
In Figures 4 and 5, depict 4 more experiments as described in Subsection 7.2.
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